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GOOD FAITH DISCRIMINATION
Girardeau A. Spann*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Courts current doctrinal rules governing racial discrimination and
affirmative action are unsatisfying. They often seem artificial, internally inconsistent,
and even conceptually incoherent. Despite a long and continuing history of racial dis-
crimination in the United States, many of the problems with the Supreme Courts ra-
cial jurisprudence stem from the Courts willingness to view the current distribution of
societal resources as establishing a colorblind, race-neutral baseline that can be used
to make equality determinations. As a result, the current rules are as likely to fa-
cilitate racial discrimination as to prevent it, or to remedy the lingering effects of
past discrimination.
Because the Equal Protection Clause contains fewjudiciallymanageable standards
for distinguishing between constitutional imperatives and legislative policy prefer-
ences, the Supreme Court should normally defer to the representative branches for the
formulation of prudent racial policies. However, the Supreme Courts insulation from
immediate political pressure may give the Court greater relative institutional compe-
tence than the representative branches in making one type of determination that is rele-
vant to enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. Utilizing its power of judicial
review, the Court could disqualify from constitutional cognizance non-remedial equal-
ity arguments that were not being asserted with good faith sincerity.
A subjective standard of good faith could be used to reject arguments that were
consciously motivated by a desire to sacrifice the interests of one race in order to ben-
efit the interests of another. In addition, an objective standard of good faith could be
used to reject arguments whose unconscious racial motivations were revealed by con-
temporary theories of cognitive dissonance and implicit bias. Although race remains
too salient a social category for the concept of colorblind, race neutrality to have much
meaning in contemporaryUnited States culture, constitutional recognition of onlygood
faith racial motivations might be able to compensate for the ongoing subtle forms of
structural discrimination that are embedded in the current distribution of resources.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue is presented perhaps most clearly in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action.1 Justice Sotomayor wrote an impassioned dissent, arguing that a
Michigan voter initiative amending the state constitution to ban affirmative action was
itself unconstitutionalcomprising merely the most recent incarnation of a long and
oppressive tradition of discrimination against racialminorities in the United States.2 Ob-
jecting to that characterization, Chief Justice Roberts concurred with the majoritys de-
cision to uphold the constitutionality of the Michigan ban and defended the honor of
Michigan votersinsisting that they were simply expressing a good faith policy dis-
agreement about the desirability of racial affirmative action.3 Both sides of the affir-
mative action debate commonly claim to be promoting racial equality, and both often
accuse the other of harboring a secret commitment to discriminatory racial preferences.
However, because their starting assumptions are so dramatically different, one cannot
help but wonder about the sincerity of those on both sides of the debate. And that, in
turn, suggests a better standard for determining the constitutionalityof racial discrim-
ination than the standard currently used by the Supreme Court. Perhaps the consti-
tutionality of racial claims should simply rest on the good faith of those who are
asserting them.
The current constitutional doctrine governing racial discrimination is notoriously
unsatisfying. The Supreme Courts equal protection decisions often seem artificial, in-
ternally inconsistent, and even conceptually incoherent. That is because they rest on a
1 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
2 Id. at 165156 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 163839 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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model of colorblind race neutrality that is simply implausible in a culture where the
influence of race remains as pervasive as it has always been in the United States. How-
ever, once freed from the unhelpful rhetoric of race neutrality, equality jurisprudence
can focus on the more meaningful question of when the cultures inevitable uses of
racewhether explicit, tacit, or unconsciousshould be viewed as constitutionally
permissible. Rather than applying the Courts current doctrinal framework, my belief
is that this question can best be answered by asking whether the proponents and oppo-
nents of the racial claims at issue are sincere in their stated commitment to equality.
If the competing arguments in a racial discrimination or affirmative action case are
sincere, they should both be deemed constitutionally legitimate. A reviewing court
should then simply defer to the political process for resolution of the competing good
faith claims. Similarly, if both arguments entail insincere efforts to camouflage raw ra-
cial preferences with a bad faith overlay of mere equality rhetoric, a reviewing court
should again defer. Although bad faith arguments are constitutionally suspect, the lack
of any judicially manageable standard for distinguishing among them suggests that a
court should allow the political process to resolve the competing claims to racial spoils.
However, when one side is sincere and the other is proceeding in bad faith, an occa-
sion arises for judicial intervention in the name of the equality principle. The Equal
Protection Clause does not authorize those who seek to subvert the concept of equality
to do so by exploiting those who seek to promote it. Accordingly, one credible function
of judicial review can be to protect those who play by the rules from those who wish
to cheat.
Sometimes the good faith inquiry will be relatively easy to conduct under a sub-
jective standard, as when a political branch asserts a pretextual concern for property
values in order to justify its desire to maintain a regime of racially segregated housing.4
In such cases, there should be some doctrinal way to recognize that insincerity alone
can make such measures unconstitutional. Prior false starts notwithstanding,5 the
Supreme Courts structural insulation from direct political pressure can make a non-
ideological Court institutionally more competent than the political branches in iden-
tifying and responding to subordinating acts of racial insincerity.
Other times the good faith inquiry will be more difficult, as when Michigan voters
chose to ban affirmative action in order to end perceived racial preferences.6 Such
inquiries can be complicated by contemporary theories of cognitive psychology. One
insight of cognitive dissonance theory is that, in order to avoid psychological dis-
comfort, even self-interested racial preferences will sometimes be experienced as
genuine efforts to promote racial equality. In addition, implicit bias studies have found
4 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26471 (1977);
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(concern with property values precluded municipal zoning decision that maintained residen-
tial segregation from constituting racial classification).
5 See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 26471.
6 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1624 (2014).
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that most of us are commonly influenced by racial biases of which we are consciously
unaware.7 The fact that some acts of racial discrimination can be understood, by those
who commit them, as sincere efforts to promote racial equality poses a challenge to the
utility of inquiries into subjective good faith motivation. In such cases, an objective
standard of good faith can be utilized in an illuminating manner if the reviewing court
is careful to apply the same sincerity standard to both sides of the racial dispute at issue.
Under the Supreme Courts current doctrinal analysis, only proponents of race-
conscious remedies are typicallyquestioned about the sincerityof their equality claims.
Opponents are simply assumed to be sincere when they argue in favor of colorblind
race neutrality. However, if the sincerity of opponents is actually examined under
an objective standard of good faithrather than simply being assumedit may turn
out that the operative motive in such cases is really to retain a disproportionate share
of resources that would otherwise be redistributed to racial minorities for remedial
purposes. By resisting the temptation to accept the existing distribution of resources as
establishing the equality baseline in those cases, the actual motive behind efforts to
maintain the current distribution of resources can be recognized as evidence of bad
faith racial discrimination.
Part I of this Article discusses problems with the Supreme Courts current racial
jurisprudence. Part I.A describes the governing doctrinal rules. Part I.B explains how
those rules can operate in ways that seem artificial, inconsistent, and even incoher-
ent. Part II argues that a standard of good faith sincerity is likely to be better than the
Supreme Courts current doctrinal jurisprudence in promoting racial equality. Part II.A
describes the proposed good faith standard. Part II.B describes how a subjective stan-
dard can be applied to easy cases, and an objective standard can be applied to hard
cases involving cognitive dissonance and implicit bias complications. The Article con-
cludes that no legal standard can force a culture to honor equality claims that it wishes
to resist, but the candor offered by a transparent good faith sincerity standard may
prompt a culture to align its actual racial practices more closely with its rhetorical
equality norms.
I. CURRENT DOCTRINE
The Supreme Courts current doctrinal rules governing racial discrimination are
largely unsatisfying because they do not do much to prevent contemporary forms of
racial discrimination. Rather, they rest on a tacitbut typically dispositiveassump-
tion that the current distribution of societal resources establishes the baseline standard
for assessing the presence or absence of constitutionally mandated colorblind race
neutrality. As a result, antidiscrimination laws can actually end up perpetuating exist-
ing racial inequalitiesironically in the name of promoting racial equality itself.
7 AnthonyG. Greenwald &LindaHamiltonKrieger, Implicit Bias:Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 966 (2006).
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Unfortunately, the Courts specific doctrinal rules seem designed more to suppress than
illuminate this realization. That, in turn, has the effect of legitimating outcomes that
often seem artificial, inconsistent, and even incoherent.
A. Rules
The Supreme Court has adopted a number of doctrinal rules to implement the
equality principle that is explicitly applied to states in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,8 and implicitly applied to the federal government in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.9 The Court has interpreted this equal-
ity principle as applying to de jure discrimination by governmental officials, but not to
de facto discrimination by private actors.10 The Courts equality jurisprudence typi-
callyrequires deference to political resolution of equal protection claims in non-suspect
classification cases that do not involve fundamental interests. The Court applies a min-
imal scrutiny, rational basis standard of review in such cases, and that standard can
generallybe satisfied byeven an attenuated, post-hoc, hypothetical connection between
some legitimate governmental interest and the means chosen by the political branch to
advance that interest.11
When a political branch utilizes a suspect classification such as race to advance its
governmental interest, the Court applies a strict scrutiny standard of review.12 In the
equal protection context, strict scrutiny is not automatically fatal.13 However, as a prac-
tical matter, strict scrutiny almost always results in the invalidation of the racial classi-
fication at issue.14 Accordingly, two primary questions must be addressed in resolving
equal protection race claims. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying the Equal Protection Clause to states).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499500 (1954) (finding an
implicit equality principle made applicable to the federal government by the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause).
10 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 20809, 212 (1973) (adopting
an expansive interpretation of de jure segregation but reaffirming a prohibition on the use of
race-conscious remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); see also Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 1718 (1971) (same).
11 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commcns, 508 U.S. 307, 31314 (1993) (requiring judicial
deference for any reasonably conceivable state of facts providing a rational basis and
plausible reasons for Congresss action).
12 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 20102 (1995).
13 See id. at 237 (stating that strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact).
14 The only two cases in which a racial classification has survived strict equal-protection
scrutiny are the now-discredited World War II JapaneseAmerican exclusioncaseof Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 21520 (1944), which upheld a World War II exclusion order
that led to the internment of Japanese-American citizens;and thenow-tenuous affirmative action
case of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003), whichupheld the UniversityofMichigan
Law Schools affirmative action plan as a narrowly tailored means of advancing a compelling
interest in student diversity.
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politicalbranch has, in fact, used a racial classification to advance its objective. Second,
if a racial classification has been used, the court must determine whether the stringent
demands of strict scrutiny have been satisfied.15
The express use of race as the basis for a governmental action is sufficient to
establish the existence of a racial classification that triggers strict scrutiny.16 However,
even facially neutral actions that do not make any explicit reference to race can some-
times constitute racial classifications.17 In making this determination, it is not sufficient
that the actions of a political branch have a mere racially disparate impact. Although
such discriminatory effects can establish unlawful discrimination under statutes such
as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 for equal protection purposes, a racial classification
exists onlywhen the political branch engages in intentional discrimination.19 The inten-
tional discrimination standard is satisfied when the actuating intent of the political
branch is to take an action because of its racial effect.20 However, it is not satisfied
when the political branch takes an action in spite of an incidental racially disparate
impact of which the political branch is merely aware.21
Because racial classifications are constitutionally suspect, they will violate the
Equal Protection Clause unless theyare shown to survive strict scrutiny. In applying the
strict scrutiny standard, a reviewing court evaluates the ends/means analysis that the
political branch conducted in deciding touse a racial classification. The racialclassifica-
tion will survive strict scrutiny only if the end being pursued by the political branch can
be termed compelling, and the use of race is shown to be a narrowly tailored effort to
advance that compelling interest.22 The narrow tailoring prong of this two-part test is
often said to require an absence of any race neutral alternative means of advancing the
compelling governmental interest at stake.23
Strict scrutiny has now invalidated the use of most express racial classifications
that, in the past, were used to engage in invidious forms of racial discrimination.24 As
15 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
16 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 1112 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to racial
classifications and invalidating Virginias miscegenation statute); cf. Korematsu, 323 U.S.
at 216 (applying strict scrutiny to racial classification, but upholding the Japanese-American
exclusion order).
17 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1640, 1648 (2014).
18 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 42932 (1971) (applying a disparate
impact standard under Title VII).
19 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 23848 (1976) (adopting an intentional dis-
crimination standard under the Equal Protection Clause).
20 Pers. Admr of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
21 See id. at 27879 (requiring actuating intent).
22 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 32627 (2003) (describing the strict
scrutiny standard).
23 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 43233 (1984) (requiring that racial classifica-
tion be necessary to advance a compelling interest).
24 Id. at 433 (that although racial prejudices may exist, the Constitution cannot sanction
state support holding of such biases through law).
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a result, contemporary race cases often involve allegations that some facially neutral
action nevertheless entails a subtle form of racial discrimination that produces a ra-
cially disparate impact. The outcome in these cases tends to turn on application of the
Supreme Courts intentional discrimination standard in determining whether a racial
classification is present.25 Other contemporary race cases often raise reverse discrim-
ination challenges by whites to affirmative action programs that make explicit use of
race in order to benefit racial minorities.26 The outcome in these cases tends to turn on
application of the strict scrutiny standards. In determining whether to apply strict
scrutiny, the Supreme Court has declined to draw any distinction between benign and
invidious racial classifications, subjecting both to the same strict scrutiny standard
of review.27
In applying strict scrutiny to racial affirmative action programs, the Supreme Court
has recognized the need for student diversity in the context of higher education as a
compelling governmental interest.28 It has rejected that interest as compelling in the
context of primaryor secondary education.29 Earlier cases suggested that a governmen-
tal interest in providing a remedy for particularized acts of prior discrimination could
also constitute a compelling governmental interest, but a majority of the Justices cur-
rently sitting on the Supreme Court has never expressly so held.30 However, it is also
true that the Court has never held that such a remedial interest could not constitute a
compelling governmental interest. To the extent earlier cases suggested that remedies
for past discrimination could justify the use of racial affirmative action, the Court has
stressed that such remedies must be directed at particularized acts of prior discrimina-
tion, and could not be mere efforts to remedy general societal discrimination.31 That
25 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 24548 (upholding the use of a verbal skills
examin hiring Washington, D.C. police officers, despite an adverse, raciallydisparate impact
on black applicants).
26 See Ricci v. Stefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (examining a challenge to the City of New
Havens promotion policy brought by white firefighters).
27 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny
to benign and invidious racial classifications).
28 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 32733 (2003) (finding educational diversity a
compelling interest).
29 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 72225
(2007) (limiting compelling interest in diversity to higher education).
30 Cf. id. at 72021 (discussing a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination).
31 This position was articulated by Justice Powell in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 30710 (1978), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 27479 (1986) (plurality opinion). Led by Justice OConnor,
this view has since been adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 32325, 330 (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination
and rejecting racial balancing as patently unconstitutional); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 61214 (1990) (OConnor, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 49496 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting societal discrimination);
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 64753 (1987) (OConnor, J., concurring) (same);
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is because the Equal Protection Clause protects individual, rather than group rights.32
Accordingly, the Court has prohibited the use of racial stereotypes.33 It has also rejected
the use of racial quotas to achieve racial proportionalityfor either diversity or reme-
dial purposesterming such efforts patently unconstitutional.34
B. Problems
As this Section explains, the Supreme Courts current doctrinal rules do not do a
good job of preventing racial discrimination. Many of the Courts decisions seem
strained and artificial. For example, the Courts distinction between de facto and de jure
discrimination in applying the Equal Protection Clause sometimes seems like an arti-
ficial effort to legitimize racial discrimination.35 Moreover, in circumstances where the
faciallyneutral actions of apolitical branch produce a raciallydisparate impact, the gov-
erning intentional discrimination standard can fail to capture subtle or structural forms
of racial discrimination in ways that also make the Courts holdings seem artificial. The
Courts efforts to distinguish intentional discrimination from incidental disparate im-
pact seem equally artificial, as does the Courts refusal to distinguish between benign
and invidious discrimination in selecting the applicable standard of review.
Other Supreme Court decisions seem inconsistent. In applying strict scrutiny, it
is unclear what does and does not constitute a compelling governmental interest, and
the Supreme Courts application of that standard sometimes produces results that are
difficult to reconcile.36 In addition, the Court has been inconsistent in deciding whether
the narrow tailoring requirement does or does not restrict the use of race to cases in
which there is no race neutral alternative,37 thereby creating additional confusion about
the operative standard of review that raises separation of powers concerns. This is par-
ticularly problematic in circumstances where the supposed race neutral alternatives
alluded to by the Court are more abstract than real.
Some of the Supreme Courts decisions are so internally inconsistent that they pose
coherence problems. The Courts prohibition on the use of quotas to promote racial
balance ultimately seems incoherent,38 as does its refusal to permit remedies for general
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (OConnor, J., concurring) (same). Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts
reiterated this view in Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 73233 (plurality opinion) (same).
32 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause safeguards
individual rights rather than group rights).
33 See infra notes 14245 and accompanying text (discussing racial stereotyping).
34 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330, 334 (deeming racial balance patently unconstitutional);
see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (same); Parents Involved, 551
U.S. at 723, 729, 732, 740 (same).
35 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208, 21720 (Justice Powell lamenting
the Courts insistence of distinguishing between de facto and de jure discrimination.).
36 See Girardeau Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOW. L.J. 611, 66465 (2007).
37 See id. at 614.
38 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (holding that the pursuit of racial
balance would be unconstitutional if achieved through quotas).
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societal discrimination,39 and to recognize the concept of group rights.40 In some
cases, the Court has even relied on the same racial stereotypes that it purports to be
prohibiting. Moreover, the divergent manner in which the Court applies its intentional
discrimination standard to claims of white and minority victims seems itself to be
racially discriminatory.
1. Artificiality
The Supreme Court has recognized a state action limitation on the scope of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equalityprinciples.41 As a result, the equal protection
guarantee prohibits de jure racial discrimination by government officials but not de
facto discrimination byprivate actors.42 However, common government involvement
in underlying acts that might initiallyappear tobe privatemakes the distinction between
de facto and de jure discrimination quite elusive. In fact, it sometimes appears as if the
Supreme Court is manipulating the two categories in ways that end up legitimating
racial discrimination. For example, the Courts refusal to extend the southern school
desegregation mandate to schools in the north and west resulted from the Courts
reliance on the distinction.43 In Milliken v. Bradley,44 the Court held that the race-con-
scious pupil assignment strategy that had been used to desegregate southern schools
was largely unavailable in the North and West.45 Unlike southern school segregation,
which had been caused by de jure Jim Crow laws and state constitutional provisions,
school segregation in the North and West had typicallybeen caused byde facto residen-
tial segregation rather than by official laws.46 As a result, the Equal Protection Clause
did not permit the race-conscious, inter-district busing of students between minority
inner-city schools and white suburban schools that was necessary for the schools to be
integrated.47 However, as the Milliken dissenters emphasized, there was a sufficient
amount of official action underlying the creation, maintenance, and funding of northern
and western school districts to justify any finding of de jure discrimination that might
be needed to permit race-conscious desegregation remedies.48 Despite the Courts
39 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
40 See supra note 2.
41 See The Civil Rights Cases, 190 U.S. 3, 819 (1883) (recognizing the state action
requirement).
42 See id.
43 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 800 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 717.
45 Id. at 75253, 785.
46 See, e.g., id. at 724 (referencing the district courts finding of a pattern of residential
segregation).
47 See id. at 73236, 74447 (refusing to allow inter-district judicial remedies for de facto
school segregation, thereby permitting suburban schools to remain predominantly white and
inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly minority).
48 See id. at 76162 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the artificiality of the de
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rhetoric about local control,49 it appears the Supreme Court was simply invoking the
de facto label in order to enable white suburban parents to ensure that their children
would not have to go to school with minority students in inner-city schools. Moreover,
as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1,50 it is simply meaningless to label a school district de
facto when it has a history of prior de jure discrimination whose effects are still
emerging, or when it has escaped a finding of de jure discrimination simply by settling
a segregation lawsuit rather than litigating it to conclusion.51 But the artificiality of
some Supreme Court decisions extends beyond the state action issue.
The modern Supreme Court initially interpreted the concept of racial equality as
prohibiting actions that produced a racially disparate impact, unless there was some
nonracial explanation for the racially correlated consequences of the act.52 Accord-
ingly, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,53 the Court read the antidiscrimination provision
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as adopting a discriminatory effects princi-
ple to implement the statutes antidiscrimination provision.54 If an employment prac-
tice such as a standardized test requirement had a disproportionately adverse effect on
racial minorities, that practice violated Title VII unless its job-relatedness could be
established.55 A showing of job-relatedness was needed to ensure that the employ-
ment practice did not simply perpetuate the effects of prior structural discrimination,
such as the historyof inferior education provided to racial minorities.56 Curiously, how-
ever, when interpreting the concept of equality in the context of the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court rejected the Griggs discriminatory effects standard in favor of a con-
stitutional standard that prohibited only discriminatory intent.57
In Washington v. Davis,58 the Court held that a verbal skills exam used to select
police officers in the District of Columbia did not constitute a suspect racial classifi-
cation under the Equal Protection Clause.59 That was true despite the exams racially
disproportionate disqualification of black applicants, and despite the fact that the exam
had not been validated to establish its job-relatedness.60 The Courts decision deviated
facto/de jure distinction); id. at 76781 (White, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 78398, 80508
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (same).
49 See id. at 74144 (discussing local control).
50 551 U.S. 701, 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51 See id. at 806, 81922 (questioning the distinction between de facto and de jure
discrimination).
52 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 42932 (1971).
53 Id. at 424.
54 Id. at 42931.
55 Id. at 431.
56 Id. at 42936 (finding disparate impact sufficient to establish Title VII violation).
57 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 246, 25052.
60 Id. at 233, 235.
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from most lower court decisions, which had applied the Griggs disparate impact
standard to equal protection cases.61 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court attempted to
distinguish Griggs by noting that, in the equal protection context, a disparate impact
standard could encompass a wide range of discrimination claims, and that Congress
should be the branch to authorize such a broad prohibition on racial discrimination.62
At a time when stark racial disparities continue to exist in the allocation of virtually
all significant societal resources,63 the Washington v. Davis Courts substitution of an
intentional discrimination standard for the Griggs disparate impact standard seems arti-
ficial. For example, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,64 the Court found insuffi-
cient historical evidence of intentional race-based discrimination in the construction
trades of Richmond, Virginiathe capital of the old Confederacyeven though only
0.67% of municipal construction contracts had been awarded to racial minorities in a
city whose population was 50% black.65 Moreover, the constitutional concept of equal-
ity under the Washington v. Davis standard now permits racial discrimination that is
prohibited by the statutory concept of equality under Griggs. In fact, the very same dis-
criminatory acts by a state employer could violate Title VII but not even constitute a
racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
Griggs was rooted in the belief that actions having racially discriminatory effects
produce harms associated with structural discrimination even if the motives behind
those actions are not intentionally invidious.66 Accordingly, it seems strange for the cur-
rent Court simply to disregard those effects, and to limit the category of constitutionally
cognizable racial classifications to that subset of discriminatory harm that happens to
be accompanied by invidious motives. It is like interpreting the criminal law to per-
mit all forms of homicide except that subset of homicides that happens to constitute
premeditated murder. In addition, the Washington v. Davis Courts suggestion that
a political branch rather than theSupremeCourt should determine the appropriate scope
of the equality principle seems strange coming from that branch of government that
normally sees itself as preventing racial discrimination by the political branches.67
Morerecently, theSupreme Courthasactuallythreatened to invalidate the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes as violating the
equal protection rights of whites. In Ricci v. DeStefano,68 the Court invalidated a
61 See, e.g., id. at 236 (referencing the Court of Appeals reliance in Griggs).
62 Id. at 23848 (requiring intentional discrimination for constitutional violation).
63 See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing current distribution of resources).
64 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
65 Id. at 47980, 50106 (1989) (rejecting statistical evidence of historical discrimination
in Richmond construction trades); id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
Richmond was the capital of the Confederacy); id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 42933 (discussing structural discrim-
ination).
67 See Washington v.Davis,426 U.S.229, 248 (declaring that an extension of the rule should
await legislative prescription).
68 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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decision by the New Haven fire department to reject the racially disparate results of a
firefighter promotion exam that had not been validated for job-relatedness.69 Borrow-
ing from the intentional discrimination precedents of its equal protection jurispru-
dence, the Court held that there was not a strong basis in evidence to believe that use
of the exam would violate Title VII.70 That was because the Court thought the City
could probably establish job-relatedness even in the absence of formal validation of
the exam.71
The Courts holding in Ricci effectively reversed the presumption of discrim-
ination that Griggs had drawn from the existence of racially disparate impact in Title
VII cases and essentially required plaintiffs to negate a default presumption of job-
relatedness by establishing what amounts to intentional discrimination. The Court
apparently viewed this as a saving construction because it suggested that if Title VII
did indeed require the firefighter promotion exam to be rejected because of its dispa-
rate impact, Title VII would itself be unconstitutional.72 The Court reasoned that such
race-conscious remedial action under Title VII would constitute intentional discrim-
ination against whites in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.73 The Court has also
given indications that it may be ready to reject or invalidate the disparate impact provi-
sions of other federal statutes, such as the Fair Housing Act.74 If the Court does indeed
hold that disparate impact statutes violate the equal protection rights of whites, it will
have eliminated the existing discrepancy between the constitutional and statutory con-
cepts of equality, but it will have done so at the cost of simply ignoring entire cate-
gories of actual racial discrimination.
The Washington v. Davis Courts insistence on distinguishing between intentional
discrimination and mere disparate impact also seems artificial. As Justice Stevens em-
phasized in his Washington v. Davis concurring opinion, the distinction can be elusive
because people typically intend the foreseeable consequences of their actions.75 As a
result, the Supreme Court in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney76 adopted a distinction
between actuating because of intent that did constitute intentional discrimination and
incidental in spite of intent that did not.77 The problem is that mixed and undisclosed
69 Id. at 59293.
70 Id. at 585.
71 Id. at 58789.
72 Id. at 58384.
73 Id. at 563, 58293 (rejecting a disparate impact claim and borrowing the strong basis in
evidence standard from equal protection cases).
74 See Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (certiorari
dismissed after settlement of case presenting issue of disparate impact under Fair Housing
Act); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (same). Apetition forcertiorari hasnowbeen
granted in yet a third case raising this issue. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Texas Dept. of
Hous. and Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, Texas Dept. of Hous. and
Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Projects, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
75 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 25254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
77 Id. at 27880 (distinguishing between actuating and incidental intent).
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motives can often make the proffered distinction untenable, especially with respect to
action taken by collegial bodies such as legislatures or executive agencies.
In Feeney, the Court held that an employment preference for veterans did not
constitute intentional gender discrimination despite its adverse disparate impact on
women job applicants.78 That was because the legislature was motivated by a desire to
reward veterans for their military service, and not by a desire to discriminate against
womenwhom the legislature admittedly knew would be disadvantaged by the pref-
erence.79 However, the Feeney characterization simply ignores the legislatures deci-
sion to provide an employment subsidy to a traditionally male category of people who
provide a valuable service to society, rather than traditionally female categories such
as nurses or kindergarten teachers who also provide valuable services. If one asks why
the legislature had a preference for soldiers over nurses and kindergarten teachers, it
is easy to imagine that the answer might well be because of gender, rather than in
spite of it.
Similarly, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation,80 the Supreme Court held that the denial of a rezoning permit for the
construction of racially integrated, low-and moderate-income housing in a white, upper-
income Chicago suburb did not constitute intentional discrimination.81 The Court
accepted the official assertion that the rezoning denial was motivated by a desire to pro-
tect property values and was not motivated bya desire to exclude racial minorities from
the community.82 But once again, if one asks why it is that property values would be
threatened by granting the rezoning permit, it is easy to imagine that the answer might
well be because of race, rather than in spite of it.
An additional way in which the Supreme Courts intentional discrimination
standard seems artificial is in its refusal to distinguish between benign and invidious
discrimination in deciding upon the application of strict scrutiny. Prior cases applied
a more deferential intermediate scrutiny standard of review to benign racial affirma-
tive action and had reserved the strict scrutiny standard for racial classifications that
entailed invidious discrimination.83 However, the Court expressly overruled those
prior decisions in Adarand Constructors v. Pena.84 It held that strict scrutiny applied to
78 Id. at 28081.
79 See id. at 278.
80 429 U.S. 252 (1976).
81 Id. at 27071.
82 See id. at 26471 (finding no intentional discrimination); see also Metro.Hous.Dev.Corp.
v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1974), revd, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975), revd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (finding motive to maintain property values).
83 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 56366 (1990) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to benign racial classification); cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980)
(finding that benign racial classification satisfied both strict and intermediate scrutiny); id. at
51721 (Marshall, J., concurring) (finding that benign racial classification satisfied intermediate
scrutiny).
84 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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all racial classifications, whether benign or invidious, because the Equal Protection
Clause gave whites as well as minorities the personal right to be free from racial
discrimination.85 The artificiality of the Courts decision to equate benign with invid-
ious racial classifications is captured by the dissent of Justice Stevens, in which he
accuses the majority of being unable to tell the difference between a No Trespassing
sign and a welcome mat.86 Ironically, the Supreme Court that disregarded disparate
impact in order to focus on discriminatory intent ultimately refused to inquire into the
nature of that verysame intent in deciding what standard of review to apply. As a result,
laws that seek to remedy past racial discrimination in things like employment, educa-
tion, and voting are now subject to the same strict scrutiny standard as laws that bar
racial minorities from jobs, schools, and the voting booth.
The applicable standard of review matters because it is likely to be dispositive.
Although dicta in Adarand stated that strict scrutiny was not necessarily fatal in fact,87
only one racial classification has ever survived strict equal protection scrutiny since the
infamous Korematsu v. United States88 decision that led to the World War II intern-
ment of Japanese-American citizens.89 In Grutter v. Bollinger,90 Justice OConnor
wrote a 54 majority opinion, upholding under strict scrutiny, an affirmative action plan
adopted by the University of Michigan Law School to increase student diversity.91
However, now that Justice Alito has replaced Justice OConnor on the Supreme Court,
it is unlikely that Grutter would be decided the same way today.92 And it is even more
unlikely that the current Court will extend Grutters non-fatal reading of strict scrutiny
to other cases in the future.
2. Inconsistency
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its application of the strict scrutiny
standard that it applies to racial classifications with respect to both the compelling gov-
ernmental interest and the narrow tailoring prongs. With respect to the compelling
interest prong, the Court has vacillated concerning which interests can be considered
compelling, and it has been inconsistent in the way that it has applied the interest that
it has most recently identified as compelling. With respect to the narrow tailoring prong,
the Court has been inconsistent in its application of the least-restrictive-alternative
requirement in a way that seems to create separation of powers concerns.
85 See id. at 22327 (applying strict scrutiny to benign and invidious racial classifications).
86 See id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 237.
88 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
89 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
90 539 U.S. 306, 34344 (2003).
91 Id.
92 Cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417, 2421 (2013) (The Supreme Court
remanded for a more stringent application of strict scrutiny rather than overrule Grutter.).
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Justice Powells controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,93 which involved a racial affirmative action plan for medical students, has
played a prominent role in setting the terms of the debate for subsequent Supreme
Court affirmative action decisions. Among the governmental interests that Justice
Powell identified as compelling in Bakke were the goal of providing appropriate reme-
dies for particularized acts of past discrimination and the goal of promoting prospective
diversity in the context of higher education.94 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,95
a case involving a minority construction set-aside, Justice OConnors opinion for the
Court reaffirmed the remedial interest as compelling. However, her opinions in subse-
quent affirmative action cases indicate that she viewed Croson as establishing that the
remedial interest was the only compelling interest that a governmental entity could as-
sert. She did not view the governmental interest in diversity as compelling.96 Lower
courts also adopted this interpretation of Justice OConnors Croson opinion.97 But
things were about to change.
In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,98 an affirmative action caseconcerningpreferences
given to racial minority applicants for broadcast licenses, the Court upheld the prefer-
ences as advancing the governmental interest in broadcast diversity.99 Justice Brennans
majorityopinion applied intermediate scrutinyand distinguished Croson on the ground
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress a special power to adopt
the FCC program that was not possessed bystate or local governmental bodies.100 How-
ever, five years later in Adarand, Justice OConnors opinion for the Court overruled
Metro Broadcasting.101 Nevertheless, when Justice OConnor later voted to uphold
the Michigan Law School student affirmative action plan in Grutter, her opinion for the
Court held that the governmental interest in promoting educational diversity was, in
fact, a compelling governmental interest for strict scrutiny purposes.102
The affirmative action cases the Supreme Court has decided from Grutter to the
present have focused on the diversity interest rather than the remedial interest in as-
sessing the constitutionality of racial affirmative action.103 However, some current
93 438 U.S. 265, 30620 (1978).
94 See id. at 30710, 31115 (identifying compelling governmental interests).
95 488 U.S. 469, 48889 (1989).
96 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 61014 (1995) (OConnor, J., dissenting);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (OConnor, J., concurring).
97 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 94148 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1033 (1996) (rejecting Justice Powells identification of diversity as compelling interest).
98 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
99 Id. at 60001.
100 See id. at 56366 (recognizing governmental interest in broadcast diversity under
intermediate scrutiny).
101 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 22327.
102 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 32425, 32733, 34344 (2003).
103 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
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Justicesperhaps even a majoritymay be prepared to overrule Grutter and once
again hold that educational diversity is not a compelling governmental interest. In
Fisher v. University of Texas,104 a case involving an affirmative action plan adopted to
increase student diversity, Justices Scalia and Thomas expressed their willingness to
overrule this aspect of Grutter.105 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,106 Chief Justice Roberts wrote a majority opinionjoined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alitothat limited recognition of the compel-
ling interest in educational diversity to the context of higher education, and refused to
apply it to a program seeking to promote racial diversity in elementary and secondary
schools.107 In Fisher, however, when Justice Kennedy had a chance to overrule Grutter
in his majority opinion for the Court, he sidestepped the issue and simply stated that
he was taking Grutter as a given in remanding the Texas affirmative action plan on
other grounds.108
Parents Involved also shows that even when the Supreme Court has identified a
governmental interest as compelling, it can apply that interest in inconsistent ways.109
The Courts decision to recognize educational diversity as compelling in the context
of higher education but not in the context of primary or secondary education seems
strange. Chief Justice Roberts noted that the purpose of diversity is to expose students
to ideas and perspectives that they might not otherwise encounter in a homogeneous
environment.110 That interest seems to clearly be advanced during the class discussions
and out-of-class interactions that students have in the context of higher education.
But as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the benefits of diversity are likely to
be even greater when younger students are exposed to a broader array of ideas and per-
spectives during their formative years.111 Because the preservation of racial integration
is what was at the core of the diversity plan at issue in Parents Involved, Justice Breyer
emphasized that the compelling nature of diversity in primary and secondary education
was precisely what was at stake in the desegregation requirement of Brown v. Board
(2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551
U.S. 701, 72025 (2007) (focusing on diversity, but also considering remedial interest).
104 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
105 See id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that he would have voted to overrule
Grutter if the plaintiff had so requested); id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that he would
overrule Grutter).
106 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
107 See id. at 72025.
108 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (taking Grutter as given). Justice Kennedy did dissent in
Grutter itself, but his dissent appears to be based on narrow tailoring grounds. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 38789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 78283 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the
majority opinion is inconsistent in both its approach and its implications).
110 See id. at 72425.
111 See id. at 83845 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that diversity is a compelling state
interest in primary and secondary schools).
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of Education112a case that itself involved primary and secondary education.113 Chief
Justice Roberts, however, invoked Brown as the basis for rejecting the diversity
claim.114 For him, the race-conscious primary and secondary education diversity pro-
gram was unconstitutional precisely because it departed from Browns prohibition on
assigning students to schools based on their race.115
The Courts application of the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny standard
exhibits an inconsistency of its own. A common articulation of the narrow tailoring
requirement insists that a compelling interest be pursued through means that are the
least restrictive of racial equality rights.116 That means that a racial classification can
be used only if no race-neutral alternative will be adequate to secure the compelling
interest.117 However, in Grutter, the Court rejected the claim that narrow tailoring re-
quired exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.118 Instead, Justice
OConnor stated that narrow tailoring required only serious, good faith consideration
of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university
seeks.119 In Fisher, Justice Kennedys majority opinion attempted to reconcile those
divergent articulations of the narrow tailoring requirement. But Justice Kennedy ended
up simply pretending that the problem did not exist. He simultaneously reasserted that
[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative120 and that a reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable
race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.121
The Courts inconsistent articulations of the narrow tailoring requirement are
important because of their effect on the operative standard of review. Notwithstanding
the Courts decision in Gruttera case that would probably not be decided the same
way todaystrict scrutiny is effectively fatal scrutiny in the equal protection context.
Normally, that would limit the Courts discretion in a way that made it harder for the
112 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
113 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 84143 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Brown
supports diversity as a compelling state interest).
114 See id. at 74243, 74648 (plurality opinion) (arguing that Brown does not allow racial
classifications for any reason).
115 See id. at 74248. Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote for the result in Parents
Involved, adopted a less-extreme view, arguing that a race conscious pupil assignment might
be permitted in some circumstances in order to prevent de facto resegregation. See id. at 78790
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
116 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (requiring a state to narrowly tailor
racial distinctions to accomplish a compelling state interest).
117 See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735 (requiring an absence of race-neutral
alternatives); cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 43233 (1984) (requiring that racial classifi-
cation be necessary to advance a compelling interest).
118 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
119 See id.
120 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (citation omitted).
121 Id.
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Court to uphold racial classifications that it liked and invalidate classifications of which
it disapproved on policy grounds. But not always. The Courts divergent outcomes in
Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger122 illustrate the problem. Grutter upheld a University
of Michigan Law School affirmative action program adopted to promote student
diversity,123 and the same day, Gratz invalidated a University of Michigan undergrad-
uate affirmative action program adopted to promote student diversity.124 Although
the two programs seemed equivalent in all pertinent respects, the Court nevertheless
reached different outcomes in the two cases because Justices OConnor and Breyer
seemed to think that the undergraduate program gave too much weight to race in its
diversity calculation.125 Once racial diversity is recognized as a legitimate factor in
educational admissions, the amount of weight given to that factor would seem to be a
policy determination that should be made by a politically accountable branch of gov-
ernment. But an ambiguous, narrowtailoring requirement that gives the Supreme Court
the discretionary power to supplant racial policy determinations made by the polit-
ical branches raises separation of powers problems. Although the Supreme Court may
possess the institutional competence to interpret the Constitution, the bare phrase
equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment does not give the Court sufficient
guidance to justifysupplanting a racial policydetermination made byapolitical branch.
When the Court gives itself enough discretion to enter the legislative policymaking
realm, it creates the risk that its policy pronouncements will be more abstract than real.
That is precisely what happened in Parents Involved, where the Courts decision rested
on hypothetical race neutral alternatives that simply did not exist.126 Justice Breyers
dissent went to great pains to stress that the majoritys rhetoric about the school dis-
tricts failure to exhaust race neutral alternatives before adopting a race conscious plan
to prevent resegregation was belied by the actual facts of the case.127 Not only had the
school tried an array of race neutral alternatives, which had proved ineffective, but the
majority was unable to suggest a race neutral alternative that the school had not already
tried.128 Accordingly, when the current Supreme Court rejects a racial classification for
failure to use a race neutral alternative, it may well be doing so in a context where no
such alternative actuallyexists.129 Moreover, even if a race neutral alternativedoesexist,
122 539 U.S. 244, 245 (2003).
123 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 32244.
124 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 26875.
125 See id. at 27980 (OConnor, J., concurring) (holding that the undergraduate program
must have individualized consideration).
126 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735
(2007) (requiring consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives) (citation omitted).
127 See id. at 85052 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (documenting exhaustion of race-neutral
alternatives).
128 See id.
129 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 241617, 241922 (remanding despite
the failure of a race neutral plan to produce the desired student diversity).
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such as the hypothetical alternatives suggested by Justice Kennedy,130 it is unclear why
those alternatives would not themselves violate the Washington v. Davis prohibition
on intentional discrimination.
3. Incoherence
Sometimes the Supreme Courts racial discrimination jurisprudence actually seems
incoherent. That is true with respect to the Courts rules about racial balance, soci-
etal discrimination, and group rights. In addition, the Courts stated aversion to racial
stereotypes is sometimes belied by its own reliance on those very same stereotypes.
Moreover, the manner in which the Court applies the intentional discrimination stan-
dard varies with the race of the victim in a way that is itself racially discriminatory. All
of this rests on a deep incoherence in the Supreme Courts underlying conception of
colorblind race neutrality.
The Supreme Court has been emphatic in its condemnation of affirmative action
plans that use racial quotas to promote racial balance or proportionality. It has repeat-
edly held that the pursuit of racial balance is patently unconstitutional.131 That hold-
ing not only departed from the Courts earlier unanimous authorization to use racial
balance as a starting point in formulating school desegregation remedies,132 but the very
notion that the pursuit of racial balance could somehow be unconstitutional seems inco-
herent. In her Croson majority opinion, Justice OConnor stated that, [t]he dream of
a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity
and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently
unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.133 In that sentence, the Court identified the aspi-
rational goal of its racial jurisprudence to be the achievement of a colorblind society in
which race was irrelevant to the distribution of resources. But in the same breath, the
Court then held that race-conscious remedial efforts seeking to advance that goal were
unconstitutional. Here is the problem. In a colorblind, race-neutral society that was free
from discrimination, societal resources would be allocated in a way that was racially
proportional. Unless one believes that some races are inherently inferior to others, the
absence of racial balance constitutes clear evidence that there is racial discrimination
lurking somewhere in the interstices of the culture. But if the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits direct efforts to remedy that discrimination and achieve that racial balance as
patently unconstitutional, then the Constitution ends up prohibiting the very equality
that it aspires to achieve.
130 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 78790 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting
constitutionally permissible race conscious strategies to promote diversity).
131 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); see also Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419;
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723, 732, 740.
132 See Swannv. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 16,25 (1971) (authorizing
the pursuit of racial balance in desegregation plans).
133 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 50506 (1989).
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That same incoherence is revealed in the Courts equally emphatic insistence that
race-conscious remedies cannot be used to address the continuing problems of subtle
and structural discrimination against racial minorities that the Supreme Court terms
societal discrimination.134 The Court limits theconstitutionallypermissible use of race
conscious remedies to particularized acts of past discrimination that were committed
by the governmental entity seeking to utilize a race-conscious remedy.135 And efforts
to remedy the continuing effects of general societal discrimination against racial minor-
ities are themselves deemed unconstitutional, because they violate the equal protection
rights of whites.136 No one doubts that subtle and structural forms of general societal
discrimination against racial minorities continue to exist in United States culture
discrimination that manifests itself in things like housing segregation, inferior educa-
tion, lower wages, lower wealth, poorer health care, less personal safety, and higher
incarceration rates.137 In August 2014, the New York Times reported:
Across a broad range of economic and demographic indicators, the
data paint a largely depressing picture. Five decades past the era
of legal segregation, a chasm remains between black and white
Americansand in some important respects its as wide as ever.
134 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding that the Court rejects
an interest in remedying general societal discrimination).
135 Cf. id. at 334 (holding that a race-conscious admissions plan must be narrowly tailored).
136 That position was initially articulated by Justice Powell in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 30710 (1978), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 27478 (1986) (plurality opinion). Lead by
Justice OConnor, the view has since been adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 32325 (citing Bakke as rejecting an interest in remedying societal
discrimination); id. at 330 (rejecting racial balancing as patently unconstitutional); see also
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 61214 (1990) (OConnor, J., dissenting) (remedying
societal discrimination is not compelling); Croson, 488 U.S. at 49496 (plurality opinion)
(rejecting societal discrimination); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 64753 (1987)
(OConnor, J., concurring) (requiring remedial action); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (OConnor,
J., concurring) (rejecting societal discrimination). Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts
reiterated the viewin Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 73132 (plurality opinion) ([r]emedying
past societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.).
137 See JENNIFERHOCHSCHILD ETAL., CREATINGANEWRACIALORDER:HOW IMMIGRATION,
MULTIRACIALISM, GENOMICS, AND THE YOUNG CAN REMAKE RACE IN AMERICA 3541,
7375, 11623, 13963, 17581 (2012) (documenting racial minority disadvantages); Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward,
43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 133646 (2011) (same); Neil Irwin et al., Americas Racial Divide,
Charted, N.Y.TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/upshot/americas
-racial-divide-charted.html?emc=eta1&_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 (same); see also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The implicit bias studies
discussed in Part II.B.2 also undoubtedly contribute to these statistical disparities.
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The unemployment gap is virtually unchanged over the last 40
years. The income and wealth gaps have actually widened. So has
the gap in educational attainment.138
Nevertheless, the position of the Supreme Court appears to be that the benefits that such
structural discrimination accords whites are so pervasive, and so firmlyentrenched, that
race conscious efforts to reduce those benefits would violate the constitutional rights
of whites who secured them through race-conscious discrimination. Stated differently,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution freezes the unequal benefits that whites
have secured through a historyof prior discrimination. And this is true even when polit-
ical branches of government controlled by the white majority voluntarily choose to
adopt such race-conscious remedies in order to reduce their own racial advantage.
The waythat the Supreme Court can end up adopting such a seeminglyparadoxical
position is by mediating the internal contradiction with yet another doctrinal move that
ultimately seems incoherent. According to the Court, the reason the Constitution pro-
hibits the white majoritys efforts to reduce its own racial advantage by adopting race-
conscious remedies for general societal discrimination, is that equal protection rights
are individual personal rights rather than group rights.139 As a result, the white majority
cannot reduce its own group racial advantage because doing so would violate the rights
of white individuals who wish to retain that advantage.140 However, the Courts argu-
ment suffers from an effort to distinguish between individual and group rights that
simply makes no sense in the context of racial discrimination. The only reason that
white individuals possess cultural advantages over racial minorities, in the context
of racial discrimination, is because of their membership in the white racial group that
created those cultural advantages. Individual merit and other personal characteristics
are simply inapposite to the racial advantages that have been secured through a history
of prior racial discrimination. Accordingly, the white majoritys decision to curtail
some of its own racial advantage cannot violate any individual equal protection rights
because no such rights ever existed. The only rights that were ever pertinent were the
group rights derived from membership in the white race.141 Even if the concept of
138 Irwin et al., supra note 137.
139 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 22425 (1995) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 299 (plurality opinion) (holding that equal protection rights are to the individual rather than
group rights); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 32326 (same).
140 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (holding that equal protection rights are individual).
141 There has been a longstanding debate concerning whether the Equal Protection Clause
is properly understood as protecting individual rights or group rights. Compare Paul Brest,
The Supreme Court, 1975 TermForeword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV.L.REV. 1, 4852 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination
remedies, should be viewed as individual phenomena), and Michael J. Perry, The Principle of
Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGSL.J. 1133, 114548 (1981) ([T]he group-centered conception
creates [tension] with our individual-centered constitutional jurisprudence), with Owen M.
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individual rights did make sense in the context of racial discrimination, it is difficult
to see why that should disable the white majority from providing remedial benefits to
racial minorities. We commonly group individuals together in order to advance social
objectives that are not constitutionally compelledsuch as deciding who should pay
how much income tax or deciding what LSAT scores should entitle one to law school
admission. It therefore seems perverse to prohibit such groupings of individuals when
the goal is to pursue an equality objective that is constitutionally compelled.
The Supreme Courts racial discrimination decisions have also engaged in the very
type of racial stereotyping that the Court has condemned as unconstitutional. In its
Shaw v. Reno142 line of redistricting cases decided after the 1990 Census, the Supreme
Court recognized an equal protection cause of action for white voters who objected to
being placed in new majority-minority voting districts as a result of redistricting efforts
to complywith the prohibition on minorityvote dilution contained in the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.143 The Court held that when race was the predominant factor motivating
a redrawn voting district, voters were stigmatized and stereotyped in violation of their
equal protection rights, in the same way they would be if they were assigned to partic-
ular schools because of their race.144 The assumption that voters would share particular
political preferences because of their race violated the personal equal protection rights
of voters to be treated as individuals rather than mere members of a racial group.145
However, by recognizing a new cause of action for white voters who objected to being
placed in majority-minority voting districts, the Court was engaged in precisely the
same form of racial stereotyping that the Court claimed to be deriding.
In order to have standing to challenge their placement in a majority-minorityvoting
district, white plaintiffs needed to allege some sort of injury from being placed in those
districts.146 But the only injury they suffered was their fear that the minority officials
likely to be elected in those districts would not adequately represent the interests of
white voters. And that injury, of course, rests wholly on the same stereotypes about
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 14777 (1976)
(arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as
group phenomena).
142 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
143 See id. at 63952.
144 See id. at 64142, 649 (permitting white challenge to redistricting plan that increased
minority voting strength); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 909 (1995) (granting
standing to whites who challenged redistricting of the voter district in which they resided, where
challenged redistricting increased minority voting strength); cf. United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737, 74447 (1995) (denying standing to whites who challenged redistricting of voting
district in which they did not reside). The Courts aversion to racial stereotyping was recently
reaffirmed in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 163435
(2014) (plurality opinion).
145 See Hays, 509 U.S. at 744 (objecting to racial stereotyping); see also Miller, 515 U.S. at
91112, 920, 92728 (same); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 64344, 64749 (same).
146 See supra note 144.
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racial cohesion and shared political interests that the Court viewed as violating the
Equal Protection Clause in Shaw.147 Interestingly, the Court now seems to have backed
off its Shaw cause of action, holding that race can be used as a proxy for political affil-
iation in the redistricting process because minorities often vote for Democrats.148 But
in so doing, the Supreme Court seems to have explicitly endorsed the racial stereo-
typing practice of which it claims to disapprove. One might argue that merit based deci-
sions, such as those involving school admissions, are distinguishable from districting
decisions that have nothing to do with merit. This, however, would not explain the
Courts decisions in cases such as Parents Involved,where theCourt invalidated student
diversity programs that had nothing to do with merit. Moreover, even merit based
decisions are likely to be infected by the racial stereotypes and implicit biases that are
discussed in Part II.B.2.
Some of the decisions that the Supreme Court issues in the name of racial equality
are themselves racially discriminatory. As Professor Farber has noted, the Court ap-
plies the intentional discrimination standard more stringently when racial minorities
claim to be the victims of discrimination than when whites claim to be the victims.149
When racial minorities are adversely affected by a practice having a racially disparate
impactsuch as the verbal skills exam used in Washington v. Davisthat practice
does not trigger strict scrutiny because it was adopted despite its discriminatory effect,
and not because of any intent to harm racial minorities.150 However, when whites are
adversely affected by a practice having a racially disparate impactsuch as the affir-
mative action preference for minority contractors in Adarandthat practice does trig-
ger strict scrutiny even though the practice was adopted despite its discriminatory
effect, and not because of any intent to harm whites.151 It is true that practices adversely
affecting racial minorities now tend to be facially neutral, whereas affirmative action
plans that adversely affect whites tend to be race-conscious. However, that difference
seems largely irrelevant once one concedes that a known racially disparate impact is
consciously being disregarded. The conscious disregard of that discriminatory effect
should either count or not count equally in both cases, but it does not. The Supreme
Court is simply more sensitive to harms suffered by whites than to harms suffered by
racial minorities.
147 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 92932 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting internal inconsis-
tency in the majoritys treatment of racial stereotypes).
148 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 25758 (2001) (permitting use of race in
redistricting as a proxy for political affiliation).
149 See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTIONS THIRD CENTURY 35458 (5th ed. 2013) (describing
racially-correlated discrepancy in the Supreme Courts treatment of racial discrimination claims).
150 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 23848 (1976) (not applying strict scrutiny to
verbal skills exams).
151 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 22327 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to minority construction workers set aside).
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The Supreme Courts recent decision in Schuette v. Coalition toDefend Affirmative
Action,152 upholding the Michigan anti-affirmative action voter initiative, provides an-
other illustration of how the Courts holdings can be racially discriminatory. In Justice
Kennedys plurality opinion, he stressed the need to defer to Michigan voters concern-
ing the desirabilityof affirmative action because theConstitution committed such racial
policy determinations to the democratic process.153 Given Justice Kennedys specific
allusion to the fact that voters might also choose to adopt racial preferences,154 one
might conclude that Schuette had the effect of leaving decisions about affirmative ac-
tion up to the votersthereby getting the Court out of the business of invalidating,
under the largelystandardless Equal Protection Clause, affirmativeactionprograms that
are adopted by the political process. But that conclusion would be wrong. As has been
noted, no racial affirmative action program has survived strict scrutiny except for
Grutter, and Grutter would probablynot be decided the same waytoday.155 And neither
Justice Kennedy, nor any other member of the current Courts conservative voting bloc,
has ever voted to uphold the constitutionality of a racial affirmative action plan.156
Instead, Schuette seems to have adopted a one-way ratchet approach to affirmative ac-
tion, pursuant to which the Supreme Court defers to the preferences of the political
process when the political process chooses to reject affirmative action, but invalidates
the preferences of the political process when the political process chooses to adopt
affirmative action.157 Strikingly, this is the opposite of the one-way ratchet that the
Supreme Court initially developed during the Civil Rights Movement, which required
deference to acts of a political process that sought to protect racial minorities, but in-
validated acts that sought to discriminate against racial minorities in order to benefit
whites.158 Once again, the Court has proceeded in a way that is doctrinally inconsistent,
but is de facto consistent with the principle of rejecting racial minority interests. That
is why the Courts current racial jurisprudence does not do a good job of preventing
racial discrimination.
152 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
153 See id. at 163537 (plurality opinion) (deferring to the political process with respect to
the desirability of affirmative action). That view was also shared by Justice Breyer. See id. at
164951 (Breyer, J., concurring) (same).
154 See id. at 1635 (plurality opinion) (Perhaps, when enacting policies as an exercise of
democratic self-government, voters will determine that race-based preferences should be
adopted.).
155 See supra notes 8790 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 15961, 26770 (2000).
157 See, e.g., CityofRichmond v. J.A. CrosonCo., 488 U.S. 469, 49498 (1989) (invalidating
an affirmative action plan adopted by democratic process).
158 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 64850 (1966) (adopting the one-way ratchet
theory in upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965). But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 52729 (1997) (rejecting the one-way ratchet theory in invalidating provisions of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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Overall, the Supreme Court has been erratic in its decisions to override or defer to
the racial policypreferences of the political branches, with deference ultimately turning
on the degree to which those policy preferences correspond to the racial policy pref-
erences of the Court. Because the Supreme Court is politically insulated, rather than
politically accountable, the use of judicial policy preferences as a basis for judicial re-
view is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of political and judicial powers.
Moreover, the Courts own racial policy preferences appear to flow from a tacit as-
sumption that the current distribution of societal resources is race neutral and color-
blind. However, the pervasive white advantage embedded in the current distribution159
makes that assumption so obviously untenable that one cannot help but wonder why
the Court refuses to look behind it. Nobody elected the Supreme Court to formulate
racial policy for the United States, but we still tend to act as if it were a mere coinci-
dence that most contemporary race cases are decided by a 54 split decisionswhere
the votes of the Justices correlate strongly with the political views of the presidents
who nominated them. The concept of equality is so elusive, that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution has remarkably little to say about which racial policy prefer-
ences are desirable and which are not. As a result, it is difficult to see why the counter-
majoritarian Supreme Court should exercise dispositive power over the nations racial
policies through the exercise of judicial review. However, the Constitution may have
something dispositive to say about the sincerity of the equality claims that are asserted
in its name. And that, in turn, may serve as a basis for legitimate judicial review.
II. GOOD FAITH
It is not surprising that the Supreme Courts racial jurisprudence is unsatisfying.
The Equal Protection Clause itself contains few judicially manageable standards for
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible uses of race,which helpsexplain
why the Courts decisions can seem artificial, inconsistent and incoherent. Moreover,
the institutional capacity of the Supreme Court to withstand majoritarian pressures to
oppress unpopular racial minorities is called into question by the Courts own historical
complicity in practices such as slavery, segregation, and the World War II internment
of Japanese-American citizenssomething that, although universally condemned, has
nevertheless presaged the current racial profiling and detention of Arab Muslims in the
war on terror.160 Even the Courts famous desegregation decision in Brown v. Board
159 See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing current distribution of resources).
160 See, e.g.,Korematsuv.UnitedStates,323U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality
of an executive exclusion order that led to the forced relocation ofcertain Japanese-American
citizens to internment camps during World War II); Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 548,
55152 (1896) (segregation); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 45152 (1857)
(slavery). Commentators have noted the similarity between post-September 11 racial profiling
and the treatment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II. See Liam Braber, Note,
Korematsus Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 VILL.
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of Education161 was ultimately read by the Court to protect de facto segregation and to
invalidate efforts to prevent resegregation.162 Accordingly, reliance on Supreme Court
judicial review may simply not be a dependable way to protect racial minority rights.
All of this suggests that the pursuit of racial equality in the United States might be
better advanced by getting the Supreme Court out of the business of enforcing the
Equal Protection Clause in race cases. In declining to intervene in a political gerry-
mandering case, Justice Scalia stated that the Constitution does not provide a judi-
cially enforceable limit on the political considerations that the states and Congress may
take into account when districting.163 The same may be true of race cases, and it might
make more sense for the Court simply to defer to the racial policies formulated by the
representative branches of government. Those policies are frequently more progres-
sive than the Courts own racial policies, but they often end up getting invalidated by
the Court.164 This is an argument that I have advanced in the past.165 However, there
may be one role that the Supreme Court can usefully play in the enforcement of the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court may be institutionally more competent than the
L. REV. 451 (2002); Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens,
115 HARV.L.REV. 1915, 193039 (2002); see also Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment:
12/7 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN AM. L.J. 195, 197200 (2002) (discussing how to apply lessons from
the Japanese internment to racial profiling post-September 11); Harold Hongju Koh, The
Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INTL L.J. 23, 3339 (2002) (arguing that the September 11
attackshave begun to warp the balance between national securityandcivil liberties, asdid World
War II); Lori Sachs, Comment, September 11, 2001: The Constitution During Crisis: A New
Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 1715, 172843 (2002) (discussing the role of the Supreme
Court in World War II); Huong Vu, Note, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security
is Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 66576, 69193 (2002) (arguing that the U.S.
Government and mainstream society have been willing to scapegoat racial minorities after
national tragedies); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United
States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 282530, 283641 (2002)
(arguing that modern terrorism legislation repeats the American habit of targeting and stig-
matizing immigrant groups and racial minorities).
161 347 U.S. 483, 49395 (1954) (rejecting the separate-but-equal doctrine, and declaring
official school segregation unconstitutional).
162 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 74243,
74648 (2007) (plurality opinion) (invalidating efforts to prevent de facto resegregation).
163 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding political
gerrymandering claim to be a nonjusticiable political question).
164 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 262731 (2013) (invalidating pre-
clearance formula of the Voting Rights Act used to prevent dilution of minority votes);
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 74548 (invalidating efforts to prevent school resegregation);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (invalidating an undergraduate affirmative action
plan adopted to increase student diversity); cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411,
241922 (2013) (remanding college affirmative action plan for more stringent application
of strict scrutiny).
165 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 557,
55758 (2011) (disfavoring judicial review).
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political branches to review the good faith sincerity of asserted equality arguments.
Indeed, the Supreme Court now seems largely to treat racial gerrymandering cases as
nonjusticiable political question cases.166 But when the Court has intervened to invali-
date racial gerrymanders, it has done so precisely because it found the lack of good
faith sinceritytaking the form of an impermissible racial motivationto be the pri-
mary factor behind the districting process.167
The Supreme Courts current racial jurisprudence is sufficiently complex that it
is possible for actions that adversely affect racial minorities to survive judicial review
even though they have the intent and effect of sacrificing minority interests in order to
advance the interests of the white majority. The intricacies of the Courts intentional
discrimination standard generate enough artificiality to permit even transparent dis-
criminatory motives to escape formal legal recognition under the Equal Protection
Clause. But a doctrinallymore elegant standard that inquired directly into the good faith
sincerity of an action having a racially disparate impact would enable such actions to
be invalidated. It is true that the Courts current intentional discrimination standard
could be applied in a way that invalidated pretextual efforts to camouflage invidious
racial intent. But the problemis that the intentional discrimination standard has not been
so applied. Instead, as Part I of this Article illustrates, the doctrinal rules surrounding
the current intentional discrimination standard are able to produce artificial results pre-
cisely because they rely on a concept of fictitious legal intent rather than a more plau-
sible conception of common-sense racial discounting. This has enabled the structural
forms of white racial advantage that permeate the culture to become embodied in the
Courts current antidiscrimination law. But properly conceived, the direct application
of a good faith sincerity standard would provide the cultures subtle forms of invid-
ious racial discrimination fewer places to hide.
The concept of good faith that I have in mind would rest not so much on formal
evidentiary findings as on commonly shared understandings of actual cultural dynam-
ics. Analogous to the role that equity plays in compensating for deficiencies inherent
in the rule of law, a good faith discrimination standard could produce results in race
cases that were more satisfying than the results produced by the Courts current doc-
trinal rules. If not abused, the Supreme Courts insulation from ordinary politics would
give the Court a relative institutional advantage in piercing the veil of rhetorical disin-
genuities that is typically offered to justify actions taken by the representative branches
of government during the give and take of negotiations in the pluralist political process.
A good faith discrimination standard could be applied to both conventional
discrimination claims asserted by adversely affected racial minorities, and to more
recent anti-affirmative action claims asserted by adversely affected whites. Because
166 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 25758 (2001) (permitting use of race in re-
districting as a proxy for political affiliation).
167 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (adopting predominant factor test
for unconstitutional racial gerrymanders).
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those claims are virtually always rooted in arguments that purport to advance the
principle of racial equality, the Court could try to assess whether those equality claims
were sincerely held or were merely pretextual. In easy cases, the Court could resolve
those claims by invoking a subjective standard of good faith. In harder cases, the Court
could utilize an objective standard of good faith in order to determine whether recent
experimental insights concerning cognitive dissonance and implicit bias warrant def-
erence to the racially disparate impact at issue. Hopefully, such a good faith focus
would begin to overcome some of the artificiality surrounding the Courts current
racial jurisprudence.
A. Concept
The Supreme Courts equal protection jurisprudence has the effect of perpetuating
the problem of racial discrimination in the United States, rather than reducing it. The
concept of good faith discrimination that I have in mind is intended to reverse that ef-
fect. The good faith discrimination standard would be satisfied whenever an action
having a racially disparate impact could realistically be understood to flow from a sin-
cere commitment to the principle of racial equality. Bad faith discrimination would
exist when a racially disparate effect could realistically be understood to flow from an
aversion or indifference to the equality principle. Bad faith discrimination would be
characterized most strongly by its recognizable willingness to discount the interests of
one racial group in order to advance the interests of another. For the sake of simplic-
ity, I have focused on divergent interests between the white majority and racial minor-
ities without disaggregating the potentially divergent interests that can exist within
those groups. However, the concepts of good and bad faith discrimination could apply
with equal force to anyconflicting interests that existed among racial subgroups aswell.
My claim is that Supreme Court efforts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause through
judicial review should defer to racial policies adopted by the political branches of gov-
ernment despite their good faith discriminatory effects, but the Supreme Court should
sometimes intervene to invalidate a racially disparate impact that results from bad
faith discrimination.
Those who favor or oppose actions having a racially disparate impact virtually
always frame their arguments as permitted or compelled by the Equal Protection
Clause. The good faith standard should therefore be applied to the motives of those as-
serting the equality argument, or to those on whose behalf the argument is asserted.
If an opponent of affirmative action argues that racial preferences are unconstitutional,
the good faith standard should be applied to the opponents motivation. If a state attor-
neygeneral argues that a referendum banning affirmative action is not unconstitutional,
the good faith standard should be applied to the motivation of the voters who adopted
the ban.
Under a subjective theory, I think that the sincerity of those asserting equality
arguments should be dispositive for constitutional purposes. When proponents and
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opponents of an action having a racially disparate impact are both motivated by a
sincere good faith belief that the action advances the aspirational goal of racial equal-
ity, the Supreme Court should defer to the resolution of the competing equality claims
that is reached by the political branches charged with resolution of the dispute. In such
cases the absence of a judicially manageable doctrinal standard for favoring one equal-
ity argument over the other indicates that there is no role for the Supreme Court to play.
It is one of those questions that is in [its] nature political, which the Constitution
delegates to the representative branches for resolution under Marbury v. Madison.168
Accordingly, the constitutional separation of judicial and political powers deprives the
Court of jurisdiction to supplant political formulations of racial policy. Under the
Marbury model of judicial review, courts are supposed to protect individual rights, but
not to formulate legislative or executive policy.169
Similarlybut perhaps less obviouslywhen proponents and opponents of an
action having a racially disparate impact are both motivated by a bad faith desire to dis-
count the interests of one race in order to advance the interests of another, the Supreme
Court should still defer to political branch resolution of the competing claims. Once
again, the absence of any judicially manageable standard makes the issue a political
question concerning the prudence of the particular racial policy at issue. Although mu-
tual bad faith discrimination probably does violate the equality principle, equal protec-
tion enforcement in such cases should be viewed as committed to the representative
branches rather than the courts.
In mismatch caseswhere one of the contending equality arguments is asserted
in good faith but the other is actually a bad faith pretextual argumentthe Supreme
Court should intervene, and should do so in favor of the good faith argument. For ex-
ample, if an opponent of affirmative action genuinely believed that affirmative action
discriminated against whites in violation of the equality principle while a proponent of
affirmative action merely feigned an equality argument in order to secure racial spoils,
the Court should reject the proponents insincere equality argument and rule in favor
of the sincere opponent. Affirmative action argumentslike anti-affirmative action
argumentsshould be deemed legitimate only if they are sincere. That means that argu-
ments for or against affirmative action should prevail only when there are sincere sup-
porters of those arguments who are willing to advance them. The goal of preventing
pretextual equality claims from supplanting sincere equality claims does provide a
judicially manageable standard that can serve as the basis for Supreme Court review.
And separation of powers concerns do permit a reviewing court to ensure that the
Equal Protection Clause is not successfully utilized to override legitimate claims of
168 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (The province of the court is, [s]olely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a di[s]cretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the consti-
tution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.).
169 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLERS THE FEDERALCOURTS AND
THE FEDERALSYSTEM 7280 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the Marbury model of adjudication);
see also Girardeau A. Spann, ExpositoryJustice, 131 U.PA.L.REV. 585, 58992 (1983) (same).
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racial equality in a way that would undermine the very purpose for which the clause
was adopted.
The good faith sincerity standard applies in both the context of invidious dis-
crimination and the context of benign affirmative action. Allegations of invidious
discrimination and defenses to those allegations should be resolved through inquiries
into the sincerity with which the competing arguments are asserted, as should com-
peting argumentssupportingand challenging the constitutionalityofaffirmative action.
In fact, for purposes of good faith sincerity review, there is no qualitative difference be-
tween affirmative action and discrimination. In each context, both racial groups claim
that their interests are being sacrificed in order to advance the interests of the other ra-
cial group. In this sense, current usage of the term affirmative action as entailing
some sort of racial preference is actually a misnomer. Legitimate forms of affirmative
action are remedial rather than preferential. When Vice President Lyndon Johnson
coined the term in 1963, affirmative action consisted of affirmative efforts to identify
and remedyubiquitous forms of invidious structural discrimination that were so deeply
entrenched in United States culture as to seem natural and inevitable.170 Once again,171
unless one thinks that one race is inherently inferior to another, a raciallydisparate allo-
cation of societal resources will be evidence that racial discrimination continues to exist
somewhere in the system. Permissible affirmative action then becomes simply a re-
medial effort to adjust and compensate for that discrimination.
It follows that affirmative action should be deemed consistent with the equality
principle if it entails a sincere effort to promote equality by providing a remedy for the
ongoing effects of past discrimination, including a present absence of diversity. How-
ever, both supporters and opponents of affirmative action should be seen as advo-
cating merely another form of invidious discrimination when motivated by a desire to
secure spoils at the expense of another race. Similarly, the constitutionality of so-
called race-neutral alternatives to affirmative action should be assessed under the same
good faith sincerity standardas should any insistence on facial race neutrality that
might end up being largely irrelevant to the sincerity of ones equality claims. To the
extent that current usage views affirmative action as synonymous with mere minor-
ity racial preferences, the remedial aspect of affirmative action that is essential to a
good faith analysis is marginalized and treated as largely beside the point.
The good faith sincerity concept that I am advocating as a basis for judicial
enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause should not seem strange. It is analogous to
the role that equity has traditionally played in mitigating the harshness of legal formal-
ism in the application of rule of law principles.172 Professor Horwitz has described
170 See Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 404 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
evolution of the term affirmative action); Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995, § 6, at 36 (same).
171 See supra notes 13334 and accompanying text.
172 See generally JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROYS EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed.
1905).
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the manner in which the common law was transformed from an eighteenth century
mechanism that promoted justice and fairness in particular cases, into a nineteenth cen-
tury instrumental device that supplanted such equitable concerns with supposed utili-
tarian considerations that were designed to protect developing commercial interests.
Once the transformation was complete, the new priority accorded commercial interests
was then frozen into the common law by the invention of legal formalism. The formal-
ist commitment to abstract rule of law principles had the effect of rendering doctrinally
irrelevant any artificiality and harshness entailed in privileging instrumental commer-
cial interests over previously recognized considerations of justice and fairness.173 To the
extent that such harshness and artificiality is mitigated today, it is through the infusion
of equitable principles into rule of law adjudication. But equitable remedies remain
disfavored, being relegated to injuries that the formalist rules deem to be irreparable.174
A good faith sincerity standard can mitigate the harshness and artificiality of the
Supreme Courts racial discrimination rules in much the same way that equity can miti-
gate the harshness and artificiality of the common law. Analogous to the eighteenth
century common law courts, the Warren Court displayed sensitivity to justice and fair-
ness concerns in adjudicating claims for racial equality that were asserted by minor-
ities during the civil rights movement. However, subsequent Supreme Courts became
increasingly receptive to the competing claims of civil rights opponents, who sought
to maintain the traditional regime ofwhite privilege. Reminiscent of the nineteenth cen-
tury instrumental protection of commercial interests, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
adopted a supposedly utilitarian model of racial jurisprudence that resisted modifica-
tions to the racial status quo. They then relied on the formalist legal categories analyzed
in Part I to solidify their doctrinal retrenchment. My hope is that a new racial jurispru-
dence based on good faith sincerity will operate as an equitable form of mitigation that
reduces thecurrent discountingof racial minorityinterests. But unlike equity, which has
been relegated to a second-class supplement to rule of law, I believe that a good faith
sincerity standard should become the primary mechanism for equal protection enforce-
ment in race cases.
The interplay between political and judicial enforcement that I envision was, for
a time, actually adopted by the Supreme Court. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment specificallygrants Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, including the Equal Protection Clause.175 In the process of upholding the
Section 5 power of Congress to invalidate an English language literacy requirement
that disenfranchised Puerto Rican voters in New York, the Warren Court adopted
173 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860
25966 (1977) (discussing the role of formalism in supplanting equitable considerations).
174 Cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 89 (1991)
(identifying the traditional irreparable injury rule, but suggesting that courts commonly circum-
vent it in order to promote justice).
175 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
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what came to be known as the one-way ratchet interpretation of Section 5.176 Although
Congress did not have the power to contract the scope of the Equal Protection Clause
by authorizing a practice that the Court viewed as an equal protection violation, Con-
gress did have the power to expand the operative scope of the equal protection guar-
antee by enacting legislation that it thought would advance the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause. This was true even if the Court did not think that the actions against
which Congress was legislating actually violated the Equal Protection Clause.177
Stated differently, the Warren Court deferred to political enforcement of the Equal
Protection Clause when it thought that Congress was engaged in a good faith effort to
advance the goals of the equality principle, but it retained the power of judicial invali-
dation where it thought that Congress was engaged in bad faith racial discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Rehnquist Court later abandoned this view. It first rejected any dis-
tinction between benign and invidious discrimination in selecting an applicable stan-
dard of review in race cases.178 That made it difficult to identify a category of good
faith discrimination that could be deemed constitutionally permissible. And then the
Court simply rejected the one-way ratchet theory outright, holding that the Section 5
enforcement powers ofCongress were limited to adopting remedial legislation for prac-
tices that the Court itself found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.179 The Roberts
Court now seems to have rejected any notion of deference to good faith political en-
forcement whatsoever. The Courts remand of the Texas affirmative action plan in
Fisher seems to have been based precisely on the Courts unwillingness to defer to the
schools good faith in determining what remedial actions were necessary to secure an
adequate level of student diversity.180 And as has been noted, the Roberts Courts
Schuette decision appears to have completely reversed the one-way ratchet.181 The
Court now defers to the political process when the interests of racial minorities are ad-
versely affected, but overrides the political process when the interests of racial minor-
ities are being protected.182 Accordingly, the need for a more receptive attitude toward
the role of good faith sincerity in race cases now seems acute.
A good faith sincerity standard is hardly a model of precision. But its inherent
ambiguity has not precluded its ubiquitous adoption as a governing standard in other
areas of the law. That is because the standard serves as an intersubjective shortcut to
176 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 64850 (1966) (adopting the one-way ratchet
theory in upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
177 See id.
178 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 22327 (1995).
179 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 52729 (1997) (rejecting the one-way ratchet
theory in invalidating provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
180 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 241922 (2013). The Court of Appeals
affirmed its original decision on remand, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), and denied rehearing
en banc, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying rehearing en banc).
181 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Actions, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
182 See supra notes 15758 and accompanying text.
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the sorts of justice and fairness concerns that cannot be captured directly by three-part
tests and syllogistic reasoning. Accordingly, the concept of good faith serves as a con-
venient way to sneak equity in through the backdoor of a legal system that purports
to be more concerned with abstract rules than the fairness of particular outcomes. It
permits the legal system to react to social realities that are understood but, for whatever
reason, cannot be recognized expressly within the governing doctrinal framework. The
subtle, yet persistent, influence of racial factors on the formulation of social policy
seems to constitute such an ineffable reality.
Despite its imprecision, the concept of good faith does provide a judicially man-
ageable standard that can serve as a basis for judicial review. Perhaps most promi-
nently, the law of contracts infuses a non-disclaimable obligation of good faith into
the performance of all contracts under both the Second Restatement and the Uniform
Commercial Code.183 The good faith obligation has both subjective and objective com-
ponents, which can usefully be applied by analogy to equal protection claims. The sub-
jective component of good faith requires honesty in fact,184 which would presumably
preclude someone from arguing that an action was intended to advance the goal of
racial equality when it was actually intended to undermine that goal. The objective
component of good faith requires the observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing
in a pertinent specialized community,185 which presumably would preclude someone
in a particular social context from disregarding generally accepted equality norms
about which that person either knew or should have known.
Not surprisingly, efforts have been made to articulate more precise definitions of
the general good faith obligation, and not surprisingly, those efforts have tended to be
only marginally helpful.186 However the concept of good faith that I have in mind sub-
sists more on what Professor Lawrence has famously called the cultural meaning of
discrimination than on articulated criteria.187 Once freed from the artificial con-
straints of current equal protection doctrine, I believe that a reviewing court will be
able to use its general understanding of racial dynamics in contemporary United States
culture to detect the presence or absence of good faith sincerity in many of the equal
protection arguments with which it is presented. If a court is not ideologically disposed
183 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); U.C.C. §§ 1-304, 1-302(b)
(1977).
184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981); U.C.C. § 1-201(20)
(1977).
185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981); U.C.C. § 1-201(20)
(1977); cf. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1977).
186 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L.REV. 369 (1980); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance
and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.CHI.L.REV. 666
(1963); Robert S. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
187 See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987).
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to ignoring the racial realities that surround it, the court may be able to do a good job
of implementing a good faith sincerity standard. Note that I am not suggesting that
such a standard can prevent an ideologically inclined court from implementing anydis-
criminatory preferences that it may possess. The Supreme Court is not above the prac-
tice of doctrinal pretext.188 Instead, I am hoping that a direct doctrinal focus on good
faith sincerity will cause a court to remember that it should not want to implement such
ideological preferences.
The nature of the political process is such that no one expects good faith or
sincerity in the arguments that legislative and executive officials make to advance their
parochial agendas. For example, opponents of the Affordable Care Act do not argue
that they are politically opposed to President Obamas economic and social agenda, and
that they hope its demise will increase political support for the Republican Party.
Rather, they argue that Obamacare exceeds the scope of the commerce power, and that
individual mandate payments that uninsured individuals must make to the IRS consti-
tute a penalty rather than a tax.189 The recent outbreak of voter ID laws in several states
is not justified as an effort to disenfranchise young, old, and minority voters who tend
to be more liberal than conservative. Rather it is justified by the need to prevent a dan-
ger of voter fraud so illusory as to be virtually nonexistent.190 In the famously disputed
2000 Presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore, the two disputing
political parties did not argue that they wanted Florida votes to be counted in a way
that would allow their respective candidates to win. Instead, they argued about whether
or not the Equal Protection Clause required an ongoing state recount to be halted for
lack of an adequate standard to govern the counting of hanging chads.191 Everyone
knows that the stated legal arguments in such cases are both politically motivated and
instrumentally invoked. However, that knowledge is largely irrelevant under the gov-
erning doctrinal standards. The actual motives underlying the proffered arguments
are simply inapposite. But however one feels about deference to political posturing in
other contexts, sincerity should matter in the context of equal protection race claims.
A good faith sincerity standard provides an appropriate basis for judicial review in
race cases, because the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce such a
standard. Unlike current doctrinal tests, which necessarily implicate the Court in the
activity of racial policymaking, a good faith standard asks the Court merely to make a
determination for which it does possess greater relative institutional competence than
the political branches. It is precisely because of the Courts structural insulation from
everyday politics that it is better able to detect and respond to any bad faith lack of
sincerity in the arguments that the Court considers. Sincerity may play no meaningful
188 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (unanimous decision holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the police from engaging in pretextual motor vehicle
stops to search for drugs).
189 See Natl Fedn of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
190 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
191 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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role in a pluralist political process, but it is crucial to a judicial process charged with
neutralizing the excesses of a political culture that repeatedly invokes insincere claims
to justify the racial oppression on which it has historically subsisted.
At times, even the Supreme Court itself recognizes the importance of good faith
sincerity. TheCourthasrejected anydistinction between benign and invidiousdiscrimi-
nation in determining when to apply strict scrutiny to racial classifications.192 How-
ever, once strict scrutiny has been triggered, the Court at least nominally engages in
the sort of sincerity analysis that I am proposing.193 The purpose of strict scrutiny is to
distinguish presumptively invidious racial classifications from those that constitute
truly benign efforts to remedy the unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country.194
Although the Court has said that more than good motives should be required when
government seeks to allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification
system,195 once strict scrutinyhas been applied, the ultimate test of constitutional legit-
imacyappears to be precisely whether the government is proceeding in good faith when
it makes use of a racial classification. Unfortunately, the baggage weighing down the
Courts current doctrinal rules seems to have placed genuine good faith judicial inqui-
ries out of reach. But it is just that defect that I would like to remedy.
B. Application
Application of a good faith sincerity standard to equal protection claims in race
cases can yield results that are more satisfying than the results produced by the Supreme
Courts current doctrinal rules. In some cases, application of the standard will be rela-
tively easy, utilizing a subjective model of good faith sincerity. In other cases, appli-
cation of the standard will be more complicated, utilizing an objective model of good
faith sincerity to accommodate recent insights of cognitive psychology. Proper appli-
cation of the good faith standard will guard against the temptation to treat the existing
distribution of societal resources as establishing a so-called colorblind neutral baseline
that defines the concept of equality. And a properly functioning Supreme Court would
also apply a good faith sincerity standard to the arguments that the Court itself makes
in resolving equal protection claims, thereby enhancing its credibility as a reliable
arbiter of racial disputes.
1. Subjective Standard
A subjective standard of good faith would seek to ascertain whether an argument
purporting to be race neutral, or to advance the cause of racial equality, was actually
192 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 22327 (1995).
193 Id. at 22830.
194 See id. at 22526, 237.
195 See id. at 226 (quoting Drew Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 485 (1987)).
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intended to have its purported effect, or rather was intended to discount the interests
of one race in order to advance the interests of another. Sometimes the answer to that
question will be unclear. But often the answer will be readily apparenteven though
the current Courts formalist doctrinal rules might fail to detect motivations that seem
obvious to a more realistic observer.
Forexample, in Village of Arlington Heightsv.Metropolitan HousingDevelopment
Corporation,196 the Supreme Court upheld a zoning restriction that prevented the con-
struction of a housing development that would have produced racial integration in a
de facto segregated Chicago white suburb.197 The Court accepted the argument that the
zoning restriction was intended to preserve a buffer zone that would protect prop-
erty values rather than to maintain residential segregation.198 But it did so as if de facto
segregation was not itself one of the things that caused property values to increase.199
Application of the Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard, there-
fore, formally blinded the Court to what must have been obvious to everyone else. The
interests of the racial minorities who wished to live in Arlington Heights were being
discounted in order to advance the interests of the current white residents who wished
to keep racial minorities out of their community.200
The dynamic causing residential segregation is so powerful and pervasive in the
United States that it should be recognized as the default explanation for residential zon-
ing restrictions that have a racially disparate impact. As Ta-Nehisi Coates has docu-
mented, the long history of residential segregation in the United States has been both
persistent and intentionally oppressive. Two hundred fifty years of slavery. Ninety
years of Jim Crow. Sixty years of separate but equal. Thirty-five years of racist housing
policy. Until we reckon with our compounding moral debts, America will never be
whole.201 Against that backdrop, those wishing to satisfya subjective standard of good
faith sincerity, and to rebut the inference of bad faith discrimination, would have to
offer a convincing account of why discriminatory intent was not a motivating factor.
That showing would be difficult to make in the context of de facto residential segre-
gation, where racial motivations are typically significant, if not dispositive. At the very
least, a standard of subjective good faith would shift the starting doctrinal presumption
from one of rhetorical race neutrality to one that actually reflected racial realism.
196 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
197 Id. at 252, 260.
198 See id. at 26471 (finding no intentional discrimination); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill.
of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (finding motive to maintain prop-
erty values); see also supra notes 8082 and accompanying text.
199 See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 26471.
200 If the residents of Arlington Heights were sincerely interested in preserving property
values, independent of any racial overtones, they would not be guilty of subjective bad faith.
However, they would still have to satisfy the standard of objective good faith that is discussed
in Part II.B.2.
201 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014), http://www
.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.
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It is also possible for racial minorities to seek the advancement of their own
interests by discounting the interests of whites. That is what Justice OConnor feared
when she invalidated a minority set-aside for municipal construction contractors in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.202 She noted that five of the nine members of
the Richmond, Virginia city council that had voted to adopt the plan were black.203 This
created a representation-reinforcement danger that the black city council majority had
discounted the interests of the white minority in order to advance the racial interests of
blacks.204 If that were the case, then the affirmative action program would indeed vio-
late the subjective good faith sincerity standard that I am proposing.
The problem with Justice OConnors reasoning in Croson is that it disregards the
fact that intent always emanates from a context. The context surrounding adoption of
the Richmond set-aside plan actually ends up supporting an inference of good faith sin-
cerity, rather than bad faith racial discounting. Although five of the nine members of
the city council were black, Justice OConnor failed to disclose that the vote to adopt
the plan was 63.205 This means that at least one white Council member voted for the
plan.206 More significantly, the plan was not only adopted by a city that had a long and
infamous history of discrimination against blacks, but only 0.67% of contemporary
municipal construction contractshad been awarded to minoritycontractors even though
the population of Richmond was 50% black.207 In this context, the Richmond set-aside
plan seems much more like a good faith effort to reduce the lingering effects of past dis-
crimination than a minority effort to exploit the interests of whites. And, once again,
the Supreme Courts fixation on proof of its artificial conception of intentional dis-
crimination caused the Court to disregard thegood faith remedial intent that almost cer-
tainlymotivated the plan. Instead, the Court accepted a bad faith equalityargument that
was offered by white challengers seeking to maintain their existing advantage over
minority contractors.
White challenges to racial affirmative action plans typically assert that the plans
violate the Equal Protection Clause by creating discriminatory preferences for racial
minorities over whites.208 The degree to which such challenges can survive the pro-
posed good faith standard will generally turn on whether the plans are or are not reme-
dial. Once again, because the existing distribution of societal resources tends to favor
whites rather than racial minorities, the starting assumption should be that such plans
202 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
203 Id. at 49596 (discussing the black majority on Richmonds city council).
204 See id.
205 Id. at 481.
206 See id. at 55455 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing Richmonds city council vote);
see also J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 136264 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Sprouse, J., dissenting) (same).
207 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 47980 (0.67% minority contractors).
208 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1977) (White
applicant argued that including race in admissions decisions is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.).
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are intended to compensate for existing minority disadvantages or to correct for an
existing lack of diversity. That means that most affirmative action plans adopted by
white majoritarian institutions are likely to be valid under a good faith standard. The
issue could be more complicated in context where there was already a racially propor-
tionate allocation of resources. But under the current distribution, the good faith va-
lidity of most affirmative action should be relatively easy to establish. That is why the
Supreme Court has been forced to offer strained arguments to justify its invalidation
of some affirmative action programs that should have been easy to uphold.
In Croson itself, Justice OConnor sidestepped a federal precedent upholding a
similar minority construction set-aside by holding that municipalities possessed less
power than Congress to adopt affirmative action programs.209 She did this even though
she plainly did not believe the argument she was asserting. She rejected her own argu-
ment six years later in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,210 where she held that the same
constitutional standard applied to congressional and non-congressional affirmative
action programs alike.211 Justice OConnor then rested her problem with the minority
construction set-aside at issue in Adarand on an argument so strained as to be striking.
The Adarand construction preference for contractors who were socially and econom-
ically disadvantaged did not itself pose any constitutional problem. Rather, the statutes
creating the preference posed an equal protection problem because they contained a
rebuttable presumption that women and racial minorities were socially and econom-
icallydisadvantaged.212 Such an observation seems so self-evidentlycorrect that reject-
ing its use as a starting assumption for constitutional analysis is hardly consistent with
the sincere, good faith pursuit of racial equality.
The recent proliferation of voter ID laws, restrictions on same-day registration,
cutbacks on early voting, and other restrictive voting laws also seem to pose a fairly
easy case for invalidation under a subjective good faith discrimination standard. Those
laws are said to guard against voter fraud, but the complete absence of any credible
history of pertinent voter fraud makes the offered justification seem simply pretextual.
In actuality, such laws are typically adopted as a means of suppressing liberal voter
turnout, and one of the things that makes the laws effective for that purpose is their
disproportionate effect on racial minority voters. The fact that these laws also target
other groups who tend to be liberal voterssuch as young people, old people, and
indigentsdoes not eliminate good faith racial concerns.213 Under current law,
209 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 48693 (distinguishing between congressional and non-
congressional power).
210 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
211 See id. at 22327 (applying strict scrutiny to congressional and non-congressional
affirmative action programs).
212 See id. at 20510 (rejecting such a presumption).
213 See, e.g., Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31
Credible Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of
-voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/ (noting that
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invidious racial discounting need not be the sole motivating factor in order to require
invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause.214 And proffering a mixed motives
defense would remain similarly unavailing under the good faith standard that I am pro-
posing. Iam, however, suggesting that the current Washington v. Davis and Feeney dis-
tinction between actuating and incidental intent has outlived any usefulness that it may
ever have had.215 Although the discriminatory objectives motivating voter ID laws and
other restrictive voting laws seem apparent, the Supreme Courts current intentional
discrimination standard is so artificial that challenges to restrictive voting laws some-
times decline even to assert racial discrimination claims despite the existence of fairly
obvious racial motivations.216
Recent profiling laws that require the stop, detention, or arrest of people who
appear to be undocumented aliens also present relatively easy cases for invalidation
under a good faith discrimination standard. The Supreme Court rejected a facial chal-
lenge to one such law in a case whose posture did not directly present the issue of ra-
cial discrimination.217 However, the racial motivation of a law burdening Latinos in
order to identify illegal immigrants is so close to the surface that it is difficult to reject
the suspicion that the law reflected the discounting of racial minority interests. It is hard
to imagine that an analogous law requiring the detention of whites would be passed if
the bulk of illegal immigrants came from Canada rather than Mexico.
The racial motivation behind the extremely successful effort to maintain de facto
school segregation in the United States is similarlytransparent. Bylinking student atten-
dance to de facto residential segregation the Supreme Court has not only acquiesced
in, but has actually constitutionalized, the racial discounting that such segregation
ID laws only stop fraud at polls); Ashley Spillane, These States Are Trying to Stop Young
People from Voting, WASH. POST (July 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/post
everything/wp/2014/07/11/these-states-are-trying-to-stop-young-people-from-voting/
(explaining that twenty-two states seek to suppress youth voting and young people are 43%
people of color); Reid Wilson, Five Reasons Voter Identification Bills Disproportionately
Impact Women, WASH.POST (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat
/wp/2013/11/05/five-reasons-voter-identification-bills-disproportionately-impact-women/
(explaining that voter ID laws disproportionately burden poor, seniors, students, and women).
214 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (adopting a predominant factor
test for unconstitutional racial gerrymanders); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 23132
(1985) ([A]n additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not render nuga-
tory the purpose to discriminate against all blacks . . . .); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ([Washington v.] Davis does not require a plaintiff
to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes.).
215 See supra notes 7579 and accompanying text (discussing problems with distinguishing
types of racial intent).
216 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding an
Indiana voter ID law seemingly motivated by partisan political considerations that correlated
with poverty and race, despite lack of voting fraud evidence).
217 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 250710 (2012) (upholding a law requiring
status checks for suspected undocumented aliens).
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entails.218 The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 even went so far as to hold that Brown itself
prohibited race conscious efforts to guard against the resegregation of post-Brown
integrated schools that was occurring because of shifting residential patterns.219
What all of these easy-case examples have in common is a willingness on the part
of the Supreme Courtand those who view the Court as setting appropriate standards
for constitutional legitimacyto overlook racial dynamics that should be readily ap-
parent. The racial dynamics that matter for doctrinal purposes rest on legal fictions
rather than the felt realities that come from actually living in the culture. The subjective
standard of good faith that I am proposing is designed to overcome this artificiality by
reminding us simply to pay attention to the things about race that we already know. Al-
though the subjective standard focuses on the presence or absence of perceived good
faith sincerity, the subjective standard is not designed to encompass recent insights pro-
vided bycognitive psychology. Those insights can be addressed byadding an objective
standard of good faith.
2. Objective Standard
An objective standard of good faith would place less emphasis on the conscious
motivations of those who take or tolerate actions having a raciallydisparate impact, and
more emphasis on the motivation that we would ascribe to a hypothetical reasonable
person who was implicated in such disparate impact under the same or similar circum-
stances. Cognitive dissonance theory, and recent findings about the nature of cognitive
bias, have now established that raciallydiscriminatorymotivations aresometimes expe-
rienced as racially neutral. Accordingly, we can use an objective standard to determine
when it is appropriate to defer to subjective self-perceptions of good faith sincerity and
when it is appropriate to disregard self-perceptions in order to compensate for uncon-
scious racial bias. This can be done most reliably by guarding against our tendency to
use existing inequalities in the distribution of societal resources as the baseline that
defines our conception of colorblind race neutrality.
People are not always aware of their inclinations to engage in discriminatory racial
discounting, in part because cognitive dissonance reduction techniques help shield
them from the implications of such knowledge.220 Since the formulation of cognitive
218 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 73236, 74447 (1974) (refusing to allow
inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban
schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly
minority); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 20809 (1973) (reaffirming prohibition
on use of race-conscious remedies to eliminate de facto segregation).
219 551 U.S. 701, 70911, 74548 (2007) (plurality opinion) (reading Brown to prevent
race-conscious efforts to stop resegregation).
220 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1824 (1957)
(describing possible ways to reduce or eliminate dissonance and how the techniques work).
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dissonance theory in the mid-1950s,221 social psychologists have recognized that
individuals have a need to reduce the dissonance that results from perceived inconsis-
tencies between various combinations of their beliefs and actions.222 Accordingly, a
person who simultaneously experiences the cognition that he is a smoker, and the cog-
nition that smoking is bad for his health, will experience psychological pressure to re-
duce the discomfort flowing from those two inconsistent cognitions. That cognitive
dissonance can be reduced in a variety of ways that include: modifying the pertinent be-
havior (e.g., giving up smoking); modifying the relative importance of a dissonant cog-
nition (e.g., deciding that smoking is not so harmful for young people who smoke for
only a few years); attributing a dissonant cognition to external coercion (e.g., smoking
is addictive and beyond my control); and modifying pertinent attitudes (e.g., believ-
ing studies that say smoking is not as harmful as most people think).223 In their often
unconscious efforts to reduce cognitive dissonance, people tend to follow the path of
least resistance. They will modify the dissonant cognition that can be changed with
the least amount of disruption.224 In most cases, this will result in attitude change rather
than the modification of behavior.225
In the context of race, dissonance reduction techniques can mask subjective
perceptions of racial discrimination. Under the facts of Arlington Heights,226 an objec-
tive observer would view the zoning restriction that prohibited the construction of
integrated housing as the outgrowth of a desire to maintain a de facto segregated com-
munity. However, cognitive dissonance theory predicts that the residents of Arlington
Heights would not themselves have so viewed their motivation. They would want to
reduce the dissonance created by the cognition that they were racially tolerant with the
cognition that they were excluding racial minorities from their community. Although
they were not willing to reduce the dissonance by modifying their behavior and permit-
ting the integrated housing to be constructed, they would be willing to use other dis-
sonance reduction techniques. For example, they might try to reduce dissonance by
attributing their zoningdenial to externalcoercion, caused bythe need to maintain prop-
erty values. Or they might try to reduce the importance of their racial tolerance cog-
nition by concluding that, under the circumstances, it was outweighed by the need to
respect natural forces governing our free market economy. It is only if other dissonance
reduction techniques failed to work that Arlington Heights residents would seek re-
course in attitude change, and conclude that it was not so important to be racially tol-
erant after all.
Cases in which the Supreme Court has rejected the interests of racial minorities
in order to advance the interests of the white majority are particularly noteworthy from
221 See JOELCOOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: 50 YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY 6 (2007).
222 See FESTINGER, supra note 220, at 79.
223 See id. at 56, 2122.
224 See generally id. at 2427 (describing resistance to reduction of dissonance).
225 See id. at 2829; see also COOPER, supra note 221, at 89.
226 See supra notes 19699 and accompanying text.
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the perspective of cognitive dissonance theory. When the Court permitted the use of
a standardized test that perpetuated the underrepresentation of minority police officers
in Washington v. Davis,227 the Court reduced cognitive dissonance. Even though the
test had not been validated for job-relatedness, the Courts holding nevertheless estab-
lished that it was the testrather than any racial discounting entailed in the decision
to use the testthat was the cause of the racially disparate impact that ensued. When
the Court required the use of a non-validated promotion test that perpetuated the under-
representation of minority firefighter officers in Ricci v. DeStefano,228 the Court held
that the applicable law mandated the resulting racially disparate impact. In both cases,
any cognitive dissonance that might otherwise have flowed from perpetuating the
underrepresentation of minority police officers and firefighters was no longer attri-
butable to those who hired and promoted them. Rather, it was a result of the external
coercion produced by the standardized tests, and by antidiscrimination law itself. Ac-
cordingly, the process of Supreme Court adjudication now appears in a new light. The
Court emerges as an institution that can actually facilitate the practice of racial dis-
counting. It can do so by serving as a cognitive dissonance reduction device for those
who would engage in the practice.
Another reason why people may be subjectively unaware of their inclinations to
engage in discriminatory racial discounting is that significant amounts of racial preju-
dice are simply unconscious.229 Since 1995, use of the Implicit Association Test to
study cognitive bias has revealed that individuals possess striking levels of bias con-
cerning social categories such as race, gender, and sexual orientation of which the indi-
viduals themselves are unaware.230 The Race Implicit Association Test uses differential
response latencies to measure the ease with which individuals are able to pair pic-
tures of white and black faces with pleasant and unpleasant words.231 People who are
faster and more accurate at pairing white faces with pleasant words and black faces
with unpleasant words than at pairing black faces with pleasant words and white faces
with unpleasant words are said to have a preference for whites over blacks.232 People
who are faster and more accurate at the opposite pairings are said to have a preference
for blacks over whites.233 And people who show no differential response latencies
are said to have no racial preference.234 Differential response latencies are thought to
reflect years of acculturation that have taught people to internalize the belief that some
227 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding the use of standardized tests for selection of D.C. police
officers despite a racially disparate impact).
228 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (requiring the use of standardized tests for promotion of NewHaven
firefighters despite a racially disparate impact).
229 See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES
OF GOOD PEOPLE 108 (2013).
230 See id. at 32, 4647.
231 Id. at 4144.
232 Id. at 46.
233 See id.
234 See id. at 45.
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pairings are more natural than others.235 It turns out that 75% of the people who have
taken the Race Implicit Association Test show a preference for whites over blacks.236
The acculturation process is so effective that this white preference is displayed by ra-
cial minorities, as well as by whites.237 The Implicit Association Test is now available
for anyone to take on the Internet, and those who take it are often surprised to learn that
their racial attitudes are not as neutral as they had previously supposed them to be.238
One might wonder whether differential response latencies on an Implicit Asso-
ciation Test really correlate with racially discriminatory behavior. The answer is that
they do.239 A 2009 meta-analysis of 184 studies looking for a correlation between
Implicit Association Test preferences and various measures of racial discrimination
found a correlation coefficient of .24.240 That established a moderate correlation be-
tween racial preferences and discriminatory behavior,241 which means that those with
high white preferences are more likely than average to engage in discriminatory acts
against blacks (62%) than those with low white preferences (38%) (the difference
equals the .24 correlation coefficient).242 The types of discriminatory behavior, with
which the Implicit Association Test preferences correlated, included favoring white
applicants over equally qualified black applicants in simulated hiring situations; phy-
sicians prescribing optimal care for white emergency room patients and sub-optimal
care for black patients; and perceiving black faces to be more angry than comparable
white faces.243
That latter result is particularly troubling given another Implicit Association Test
finding. When a Weapons Implicit Association Test was taken by 80,000 individuals,
70% of those who took the Test displayed a stronger connection between blacks and
weapons than between blacks and innocuous items such as cell phones and wallets.244
The fear is that implicit cognitive racial bias of this sort can produce tragic results, as
it may have when four New York City police officers infamously shot and killed
Amadou Diallo in 1999.245 The unarmed black Diallo reached for his wallet to show
the police his identification, but the heavily armed white officers shot him repeatedly
in a hail of forty-one bulletsmistakenly concluding that he was reaching for a gun.246
The phenomenon of white police officers and security patrollers mistakenly killing
unarmed black men has continued to the present time. This is illustrated by more recent
235 Id. at 3940.
236 Id. at 47.
237 See id. at 105, 10910.
238 See id. at 42, 46.
239 Id. at 49.
240 Id. at 4950.
241 Id. at 50.
242 Id. at 51.
243 Id. at 49.
244 Id. at 10305.
245 Id. at 106.
246 Id.
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deaths including those of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida; Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri; Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York; and John Crawford III
in a Beavercreek, Ohio, Wal-Mart.247
The fact that the cognitive dissonance and implicit bias associated with racial
discounting can escape conscious awareness poses problems for the application of
a good faith discrimination standard. Although ubiquitous, such dissonance and bias
will often not be subjectively experienced as insincere or racially discriminatory. As
a result, a subjective standard of good faith will not provide a reliable basis for invali-
dating such racial discounting. Indeed, it is precisely this type of subtle, yet pervasive,
discrimination that slips through the cracks of the Supreme Courts current doctrinal
rules requiring particularized intentional discrimination, and disregarding general soci-
etal discrimination.248 And it is this doctrinal deficiency that I hope to remedy through
the use of a good faith sincerity standard for equal protection enforcement. Accord-
ingly, an objective theory of good faith will be required to identify and respond to the
types of discriminatory racial discounting, of which the practitioners are themselves
subjectively unaware. By asking whether a reasonable person under the circumstances
would or should have guarded against the dangers of cognitive dissonance and implicit
bias, an objective standard can help advance the goal of racial equality.
Those who are aware of cognitive dissonance and implicit bias problems, but
choose simply to ignore them when fashioning their equality arguments will, of course,
violate the subjective good faith standard. More sophisticated players whoaffirmatively
choose not to inquire into cognitive dissonance and implicit bias problems, for fear that
the ensuing knowledge might undercut the equality arguments that they wish to make,
also violate the good faith standard. Their strategy is like an executives contrived
ignorance in maintaining deniability with respect to a subordinates misconduct
something that is generally sufficient to establish criminal intent, but might not always
be viewed as unethical.249 This sort of head-in-the-sand ostrich morality might also be
viewed as subjective bad faith. But even if it is not, it should be viewed as violating the
objective standard of good faith, for the same reason that the objective standard is vio-
lated by those with no knowledge of cognitive complications.
Thosewhooffer equalityarguments with no knowledgeof thecognitivedissonance
and implicit bias influences under which they might be operating may not be guilty
of subjective bad faith, but they should nevertheless be deemed to have violated the
objective standard of good faith. They may not have known about these cognitive
247 See Gene Demby, What Does It Mean To Prevent The Next Michael Brown?, NPRCODE
SWITCH BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/09/03
/344653185/what-does-it-mean-to-prevent-the-next-michael-brown; MarcH.Morial,Editorial,
Stop the War on Young Black Men in America, CHI. DEFENDER, Aug. 27, 2014, available at
2014 WLNR 25873158.
248 See supra notes 13435 and accompanying text (discussing subtle and pervasive struc-
tural discrimination).
249 See David Luban, Essay, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999) (discussing
implications of willful blindness in criminal and ethical contexts).
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threats to the equalityprinciple, but they should have known about them. Under current
law, we impute knowledge of the Supreme Courts esoteric equal protection jurispru-
dence to those who are subjectively unaware of the doctrinal intricacies entailed in the
de facto/de jure distinction,250 the Washington v. Davis/Feeney distinction,251 and the
divergent roles that diversity plays in primary, secondary, and higher education.252 We
should likewise impute knowledge of cognitive dissonance and implicit bias insights
to those who claim the expertise to formulate arguments about the intricacies of the
Equal Protection Clause. This not only enables equality determinations to be made at
a more meaningful level of analysis, but it also creates an incentive for individuals to
pay attention to the unconscious factors that may be motivating their decisions to take
actions that have a racially disparate impact.
Objective good faith inquiries can also serve as a check on judicial excesses. A
courts adjudication of racial discrimination claims ultimately rests on nothing more
than the arguments about racial equality that the court either accepts or rejects. As a
result, the legitimacy of a courts racial decisions can also be judged under an objective
standard of good faith sincerity. Aspirations of judicial independence notwithstanding,
a courts own ideological and unconscious biases can remain unrecognized when the
court invokes doctrinal tests that are as complex and opaque as those mandated by the
Supreme Courts current racial jurisprudence. But a courts own biases emerge more
readily when the court is called on to apply a doctrinal standard as simple and transpar-
ent as good faith sincerity in explaining why it has accepted or rejected the arguments
with which it has been presented. The lack of doctrinal complexitysimplyclears out the
underbrush in which illegitimate biases might otherwise successfully hide.
As I stated in the first sentence of this Article, the pertinent issue is presented
perhaps most clearly in the Schuette decision upholding the Michigan Proposal 2
voter initiative that amended the state constitution to ban affirmative action. If the
Michigan voters were motivated by a sincere desire to advance the goal of colorblind
racial equality, they may have satisfied a subjective standard of good faith. That seems
to be what Chief Justice Roberts was arguing in his concurrence, with his matter-of-fact
assertion that the debate before the Court simply reflected a good faith difference of
opinion about the costs and benefits of racial affirmative action.253 This attachment to
a subjective understanding of equal protection is reminiscent of his Parents Involved
aphorism that [T]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrim-
inating on the basis of race.254 Justice Scalias Schuette concurrence in the judgment
went even further down the subjective path, declaring that Proposition 2 could not
250 See supra notes 41198 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 7579 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 9394, 10330 and accompanying text.
253 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (People can disagree in good faith on this issue, but it similarly does
more harm than good to question the openness and candor of those on either side of the debate.).
254 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
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violate the Equal Protection Clause because its prohibition on racial preferences simply
required what the Equal Protection Clause itself demands.255 Justice Scalia was thereby
using this understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as a dissonance reduction
mechanism. However, Justice Scalia did not address the observation that requiring the
same treatment of groups that are differently situated to begin with will simply perpet-
uate the consequences of past discrimination.
Once one views the adoption of Proposal 2 in the context of past discrimination,
an objective standard of good faith could produce a different constitutional analysis.
In effect, that is what Justice Sotomayor was arguing in dissent, when she viewed
Proposal 2 as unconstitutional preciselybecause it constituted the current incarnation
of a long tradition of racial discrimination in the United States.256 Justice Sotomayor
sought to expose what she viewed as the reductionism inherent in the Roberts and
Scalia view, by stating that [T]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with
eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.257
Perhaps fearing that Justice Sotomayor was mocking his Parents Involved apho-
rism, Chief JusticeRobertsdismissivelymarginalized her concerns in a terse concurring
opinion whose tone seemed more condescending than engaging.258 By acquiescing in
this marginalization, the Schuette majority seems to have taken the most interesting
equality issue off the table. It simply assumed, without analysis that Proposal 2 was not
itself an act of racial discrimination. It could do so, however, only by accepting the
current distribution of societal resources as a race neutral, colorblind baseline, against
which the affirmative action barred by Proposal 2 could be deemed racially prefer-
ential. But because we should all understand that the current distribution is far from
neutral, an objective standard of good faith would produce a different analysis.259
3. Baseline Inequality
The current distribution of societal benefits and burdens in the United States is
racially correlated. Because that distribution was produced by a long history of racial
discrimination, good faith affirmative action can be characterized as remedial rather
than preferential in nature. In fact, all actions having a racially disparate impact can be
viewed as ultimately resting on some form of societal discrimination that continues
to exist somewhere in the system. Unless one believes that racial minorities are inher-
ently inferior to whites, the persistence of subtle and pervasive forms of discrimination
255 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1639, 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring).
256 See id. at 165156 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 1676.
258 See id. at 163839 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
259 Justice Breyer viewed Proposal 2 as prohibiting racial preferences, but reserved the right
to reach a different conclusion if Proposal 2 were deemed to prohibit affirmative action that was
remedial rather than preferential. See id. at 164849 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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offers the most plausible explanation for why so many of our societal actions have a
racially disparate impact.260
Professor Ian Haney López has argued that a well-funded, right-wing plutocracy
has successfully used tacit dog whistle race-baiting techniques to increase its concen-
tration of wealth in the United States. By convincing whites that broad redistributive
programs are actually programs that benefit racial minorities at the expense of whites,
the plutocrats were able to utilize white hostility to racial minorities as a means of get-
ting whites to vote against their own economic interests. This was accomplished by
characterizing the existing distribution of resources as neutral and colorblind, thereby
branding any effort to deviate from the existing distribution racially discriminatory.
But far from being on an arc of history bend[ing] toward justice, Professor López
argues that we are at a point in our cultural evolution where the only way to combat this
post-racial misconception of racial equality is by emphasizing the role that systemic
racial discrimination has played in the creation and perpetuation of the existing, dis-
criminatory distribution.261
Under an objective standard of good faith, those making equality arguments could
not simply ignore the current unequal distribution of resources. Instead, they would
have to frame their arguments in a way that showed why the equality principle was ad-
vanced despite the current raciallycorrelated distribution. Although the Supreme Court
and the public often resist the idea that structural discrimination merits a remedial re-
sponse, the impact of cognitive dissonance and implicit bias insights suggest that it is
only by addressing the problem of structural discrimination head on that we can hope
to make meaningful progress toward the realization of racial equality.
Viewed in this light, Michigans Proposal 2 in Schuette does not seem to survive
scrutiny under an objective standard of good faith. It seems more like an invidious ef-
fort to invalidate compensatory remedies for the existing racial distribution than a good
faith effort to achieve racial equality. As Justice Sotomayor argued, Proposal 2 simply
seems like yet another effort to perpetuate the long historyof racial discounting under
which we have traditionallysacrificed minority interests in order to advance the inter-
ests of whites. Viewed against the baseline of the current distribution, Proposal 2 does
not ban invidious racial preferences. Rather it becomes an invidious racial preference.
In addition, when viewed through the lens of objective good faith sincerity, the
affirmative action programs that Proposal 2 supposedly targetssuch as the diversity
programs at issue in Grutter, Gratz, Parents Involved, and Fishershould not even fall
within the scope of the Proposal 2 prohibition. As efforts to promote diversity by com-
pensating for the existing unequal distribution of educational resources, such programs
entail neither discrimination nor racial preferences. Rather, they entail remedial
260 See supra notes 13537 and accompanying text (discussing racially correlated distri-
bution of resources).
261 See IAN HANLEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE
REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS ix-xiv, 194-209, 218-31 (2014).
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efforts to combat our lingering propensity to engage in structural forms of societal
discrimination that reflect our implicit biases.
Representation-reinforcement theoriesof judicial reviewseek to compensate for the
underrepresentation of minorities in the political process by approximating outcomes
that would be produced in a properly functioning political society. Similarly, the reme-
dial efforts that are outlawed by Proposal 2 seek merely to compensate for the under-
representation of minorities in the distribution of resources, in order to approximate
the distribution that would exist in a colorblind, race neutral society. It is difficult to
see how such remedial efforts couldwith good faith sinceritybe deemed to violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
The reason so many Supreme Court race cases seem wrong is that they consti-
tutionalize the current distribution of resources in a way that provides legal cover for
the racial discounting that continues to be so deeply embedded in United States culture.
By treating the current distribution as if it were legitimate, and rejecting affirmative
action redistributions as if they were discriminatory rather than remedial, the Court
itself ignores the good faith discrimination standard. Under an objective standard of
good faith the Court could privilege neither the current distribution nor any prof-
fered redistribution. Rather, all distributions of resources would be treated as racial
distributionsbecause all distributions are racial distributions. The United States has
never managed to achieve race neutrality in its allocation of societal resources. As a
result, those arguing on all sides of the affirmative action debate would have the same
burden of showing that racial allocations they favored were justified by the equality
principle. The current distribution would no longer get a free ride simply because it
happened to be ensconced in the status quo. The concept of colorblind race neutrality
might continue to be treated as an aspirational objective, but it could never be invoked
to describe the current distribution. Merely asserting such a claim would reveal that
the argument it was offered to support was not an argument that was being made in
good faith.
It follows that the Supreme Court should apply the same standard to Proposal 2
type bans on affirmative action as it applies to the adoption of affirmative action. It
should require sincerely held, equality based justifications for both types of actions.
Under its current doctrinal rules, the Court has permitted selective indifference to mi-
nority interests in rejecting affirmative action claims, while prohibiting selective indif-
ference to white interests in rejecting minority discrimination claims.262 But a good
faith, discrimination standard would require identical treatment forboth typesof claims.
Moreover, the inevitable influence of race in the distribution of resources means that
there can be nothing wrong with race consciousness per se. An adequate reason for
rejecting affirmative action cannot simplybe a reluctance to use racial classifications,
because race consciousness is equally implicated in both the adoption and the rejection
262 See supra notes 14951 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistent treatment of
selective racial indifference under the current intentional discrimination standard).
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of affirmative action. Once again, when race is as salient as it is in the United States,
there can be no such thing as race neutrality. We can only hope that race will be used
in good faith, rather than as a bad faith smoke screen for continued racial discounting.
If you are inclined to resist the conclusion that the culture remains racially biased
rather than racially neutral, consider the sorts of things that you would have to believe
in order to support that view. You would have to believe that the dramatic racial dis-
crepancies in the distribution of nearly all significant societal resources is simply a
statistical aberration that deviates from the racially proportional allocation that the
laws of probability would normally predict. You would have to believe that whites
and minorities would be equally welcome to live in particular inner-city or suburban
neighborhoods. You would have to believe that when we decide which schools are to
receive the best teachers, books and facilities, those resources are just as likely to end
up in minority schools as in white schools.
You would have to believe that when we decide where to site a toxic waste dump,
it is just as likely to end up next to a white community as a minority community. You
would have to believe that in a natural disaster, the government would be just as likely
to send a limited supply of food, water, and medicine to a minority community as to
a white community. You would have to believe that when you got sick and needed a
doctor, the care you received would be just as good in a minority hospital as in a white
hospital. You would have to believe that when you decided that you wanted to be rich,
you would have just as good a chance of achieving your goal if you were a racial mi-
nority as if you were white. You would have to believe that when your children de-
cided to get married and have children of their own, you would be indifferent about
the race of people they selected as their spouses. You would have to believe that, if
given the choice prior to your birth, you would be indifferent about the race that you
would turn out to be.
You would have to believe that Supreme Court voting blocs in a long series of
split decisions that upheld the interests of the white majority and rejected the interests
of racial minorities just happened to be ideologically aligned. You would have to be-
lieve that when you compare contemporary and historic maps of the United States, the
striking overlap between slave states and red states is simply a coincidence.263 You
would have to believe that even though we have always discriminated against racial mi-
norities in the past, we have all of a sudden stopped doing so in the present. You would
have to believe that the people who discount the interests of racial minorities today
would not have been the same people who owned slaves, adopted Jim Crow laws, dis-
enfranchised minorityvoters, and insisted on segregated schools in the past. You would
have to believe that those college students who thought that they would be entitled to
$1 million in damages per year if they were suddenly transformed from white to black
263 See Slave States and Red StatesWith Map, DAILY KOS (Nov. 5, 2004, 2:20 PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/11/05/70624/-Slave-States-and-Red-States-With-Map
(showing maps).
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were simply mistaken about the racial dynamics of the society in which they lived.264
You would have to believe a plethora of things that one could not easily believe if one
lived in contemporary United States culture.
The fact that the culture discounts the interests of racial minorities in allocating
societal resources does not mean that all remedial redistribution efforts are necessarily
constitutional. There are coherent arguments that can be made against the race con-
scious allocation of resources. For example, some might argue that even though racial
discrimination continues to exist, overall utility is reduced when the costs of racial
remedies to the society as a whole outweigh the benefits to racial minorities. It may be
that redistribution will harm adversely affected whites more than it will benefit racial
minorities because whites can make better use of the resources that would be redistrib-
uted. The endowment effect could also cause those who currently possess resources to
value them more highly than those who do not yet possess them. In addition, redistribu-
tion might harm the interests of racial minorities because it could produce resentment
and stigmas that would reduce minority self-esteem and the esteem in which minorities
are held by whites.
Utilitarian opposition could also be rooted in the belief that even if discrimination
continues to exist, race-conscious remedies are bad because they benefit middle-class
minorities and ignore lower-class minorities in a way that is camouflaged by the belief
that the problem of racial discrimination is being addressed. Such utilitarian arguments
may ultimately be persuasive, or they may end up merely serving as new vehicles for
racial discounting. But what is important for present purposes is that the Supreme
Court should evaluate them under a good faith standard of judicial review. If an argu-
ment fails to satisfy subjective and objective standards of good faithgiven the context
in which theargument is made, and the cognitive dissonance and implicit bias consider-
ations that it might implicatethe Court should reject the arguments. If, however, the
argument is made in good faith, the Court should simplypermit the political branches
to determine its merit.
The good faith sincerity standard that I am proposing could modify existing
doctrine in significant ways. It could collapse the Washington v. Davis distinction be-
tween discriminatory intent and disparate impact. Once it was realized that people nor-
mally intend what they can foresee, disregarding predictable racial discounting would
not satisfy a subjective standard of good faith. Moreover, once legal doctrine officially
recognized the influence of cognitive dissonance and implicit bias insights, even the
failure to look affirmatively for evidence of likely racial discounting would entail con-
scious ignorance of racial discounting that failed to satisfy an objective standard of
good faith. Because the operative disparate impact standard that ensued would rest
upon the subtle, pervasive, and structural causes of the present racial distribution of re-
sources, reliance on a good faith standard would tacitly overrule the Supreme Courts
prohibition on remedies for general societal discrimination. It would follow that the
264 See ANDREW HACKER,TWO NATIONS: BLACK &WHITE, SEPARATE,HOSTILE,UNEQUAL
3132 (1992).
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current Courts hostility to quotas and proportionality would become misguided relics
of an artificial concept of equality that had thankfully been rendered obsolete. The
whole point of the good faith Equal Protection Clause would be to guarantee precisely
that sort of racial balance in the allocation of resources. We could then abandon the
quest for supposedly race neutral resource allocation algorithms that end up serving
only to maintain the charade that we now live in a postracial culture.
A good faith discrimination standard might even make sense of the otherwise
intractable political structure doctrine that was marginalized but not overruled in
Schuette, by utilizing the doctrine to distinguish between those political structures that
were intended to facilitate racial discounting and those that were not. A good faith stan-
dard could also relieve us of the need to pretend that the affirmative action programs
at issue in Grutter and Gratz were actually distinguishable, or that the diversity dif-
ferences between Grutter and Parents Involved reflect anything other than changes in
Supreme Court personnel. And it would certainly save us from the need to acquiesce
in Schuettes insistence that we defer to the political process when it protects the inter-
ests of the white majority, but not when it seeks to protect minorities from an ongoing
history of racial oppression. The ideology of white supremacy that motivated the racial
discounting of the past has now been formally placed behind us. But there remains the
danger that white supremacy is simply something we no longer talk about out loud.
And such silence, of course, should not be mistaken for an actual good faith commit-
ment to the principle of racial equality.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Courts racial jurisprudence does not do a good job of preventing
racial discrimination. In fact, the constitutional doctrine governing discrimination and
affirmative action claims is more likely to facilitate the discounting of racial minority
interest for the benefit of the white majority than it is to prevent or remedy ongoing dis-
crimination against racial minorities. The Courts current doctrinal rules are artificial,
internally inconsistent, and conceptually incoherent. They often end up masking the
subtle, pervasive, and structural ways in which racial minorities are disadvantaged by
the very practices that the Supreme Court finds to be permitted or even compelled by
the Equal Protection Clause. Under the Courts rules, societal resources remain allo-
cated in raciallycorrelated ways that produce de facto segregated communities, racially
identifiable schools, and a range of other social and economic disadvantages for racial
minorities. The forces producing those resource allocations are often as transparently
racial as the motivations behind the new spate of restrictive election laws that invoke
phantom voting fraud to justify actions that disenfranchise minority voters. But the
Courts current doctrinal rules are so firmly rooted in formalism rather than realism that
they often treat such obvious racial motivations as doctrinally irrelevant.
There is a better way to deal with the problem of racial discrimination. Rather
than adhering to its current racial jurisprudence, the Supreme Court should normally
limit its intervention in race cases by deferring to the representative branches in the
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formulation of racial policy and the resolution of racial policy disputes. The Court
should use judicial review to intervene in the political process onlywhere it appears that
an action producing a racially disparate impact rests on an asserted equality argument
that is not sincerely held in good faith. For reasons of relative institutional competence,
the Court is not well-suited to formulate racial policy for the nation. However, its in-
sulation from direct political influence may give it an advantage over the political
branches in detecting and exposing disingenuous claims of racial equality. A subjective
standard of good faith can be used to disqualify arguments that are consciously in-
tended to impede rather than advance the equality principle. In addition, an objective
standard of good faith can be used to disqualify arguments that should be viewed as
impeding rather than advancing the equality principle in light of contemporary cogni-
tive dissonance and implicit bias insights. The objective standard can be used to correct
for our tendency to treat the current, racially skewed distribution of resources as if it
were a baseline for colorblind race neutrality. Recognizing that the current distribution
reflects the continuing inertia of past racial discrimination, an objective standard can
compensate for the racial discounting that permeates the Supreme Courts current
doctrinal rules.
Nothing as simple as a doctrinal standard can make a culture honor equality claims
that it would prefer to disregard. However, a transparent standard that directly focused
attention on good faith sincerity might remind a culture that it was not living up to the
aspirational norms that it set for itself in adopting an Equal Protection Clause. In a cul-
ture where race is as salient a social category as it has always been in the United States,
there can be no such thing as colorblind race neutrality. Although the immediacy of
underlying racial considerations can vary from one context to another, the influence of
race will always be at least unconsciouslypresent. That means that all societal actions
are in some sense racially discriminatory. But even though we cannot escape the pull
of racial discrimination, we can endeavor to ensure that the discriminatory forces to
which we submit are only the forces of good faith discrimination.
The Supreme Court has not historically been good at distinguishing between good
faith and bad faith equality arguments. Indeed, some of the current Courts most trou-
blesome discrimination and affirmative action decisions seem to rest on what can best
be understood as bad faith arguments about the nature of racial equality. However,
if the Court were to hold itself to a doctrinal standard that recognized as legitimate only
those equality arguments that resisted the discounting of racial minority interests, the
benefits could be manifold. Not only would the cause of racial equality in the United
States be advanced, but the Court could end up serving as a moral exemplar for the rest
of us. If the Supreme Court were more honest in explaining why it does what it does,
rather than offering disingenuous doctrinal explanations to camouflage its own ideo-
logical preferences, maybe we would all internalize a preference for making sincere
arguments rather than arguments that were merely expedient. The Courts example
might convince us that we would all be better off living in a culture where the only ar-
guments that were considered legitimate were the arguments that we actually believed.
